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A RATIONALE OF CRIMINAL
NEGLIGENCE
(Continued from November issue)
RoY MOREL A D*
2. METHODS Op DESCRIBING THE NEGLIGENCE REQUIRED
'FOR CRIMINAL LIABILITY
The proposed formula for criminal negligence describes the
higher degree of negligence required for criminal liability as
"conduct creating such an unreasonable risk to life, safety,
property, or other interest for the unintentional invasion of
which the law prescribes punishment, as to be recklessly disre-
gardful of such interest."
This formula, like all such machinery, is, of necessity, ab-
stractly stated so as to apply to a multitude of cases. As in the
case of all abstractions, it is difficult to understand without
explanation and illumination. What devices can be used to make
it intelligible to judges and juries in individual cases q
a. Describing criminal negligence by comparing it with evil
A favorite method employed in the cases to describe crimi-
nal negligence is to compare it with civil negligence. This is one
of the devices adopted in the proposed formula. The funda-
mental question, what is negligence, is answered the same way in
each case by saying that it is unreasonably dangerous conduct.10
* A.B., Transylvania College, 1920; LL.B., University of Ken-
tucky College of Law, 1923; JD., University of Chicago Law School,
1928; S.T.D., Harvard University, 1942. Professor of Law, Univer-
sity of Kentucky College of Law; contributor to various legal
periodicals.
I This principle has been fully accepted in the law of torts. Its
acceptance in crimes has been hampered by the supposed require-
ment of some sort of mens rea. However, many decisions on the
criminal side based upon negligence can be explained only on the
basis of an objective standard. See the discussion, supra, pp. 34-41,
"The Objectivity of Negligence." Recent writers, text and period-
ical, support the objective theory. For example, see May, op. cit.
supra note 136, secs. 24-27. See Note (1940) 28 Ky. L..J. 237. Cf.
Note (1939) 27 Ky. L. J. 229.
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Despite the fact, however, that negligence in crimes and negli-
gence in torts are the same in kind,' 54 they differ in degree. 1 55
The 'rsk which such conduct entails must be greater for
criminal liability than is required for civil. To illustrate, sup-
pose that negligent conduct were measured on an ordinary
yardstick. After the place on the yardstick corresponding to the
amount of dangerous conduct required for civil liability is
reached, it will be necessary to move an appreciable distance
farther along the stick to mark the place where criminal liability
begins.15 6
Describing criminal negligence by comparing it with civil
negligence is a very helpful device for getting the jury properly
oriented and started on the right track. In using it, the judge
will begin his instructions by explaining that all negligence is
unreasonably dangerous conduct. He will be able to describe the
type of such conduct which constitutes civil negligence with
reasonable certainty Thus, the quest for an understanding of
criminal negligence starts on firm, familiar ground.
From this familiar beginning, the judge will chart the
direction of the course which leads to criminal negligence. He
will tell the jury that civil and criminal negligence differ only in
degree. He will then present this difference graphically by
means of the yardstick illustration, or some similar device.
It is true that these devices do not explain how much crinm-
nal negligence differs in degree. They do not locate on the yard-
stick the place where it begins. Additional aids must be pro-
vided for that purpose.
b. Using the phrase, "conduct recklessly disregardful
of an interest of others," to indicate the "hgher degree"
of negligence required
The second device adopted by the English and American
cases to describe criminal negligence is the use of vivid ad-
See note 108, supra.
I See note 109, supra.
"A charge under an indictment for culpable negligence should
define negligence clearly, and then add that culpable negligence
must be something more than that, consisting of aggravated facts
and circumstances which, in the opinion of the jury, demand crimunal
punishment rather than mere civil liability." People v. Angelo, 221
N.Y.S. 47, 49 (1927).
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jectives emlloyed to qualify the word "negligence." There are
several objections to the adjectives commonly employed. They
are not sufficiently exact to be of material aid. Vague append-
ages like "gross," "criminal," "culpable," "clear," "com-
plete," and "wicked," '1 57 do not illuminate "negligence" be-
cause their own meaning is clouded. Using an ambiguous
adjective to describe an uncertain noun adds nothing to its un-
derstanding. Two vague words do not add up to make a positive
concept.
Another objection to these adjectives is that they are used
interchangeably although they are not synonymous. One is as
likely to be used as another in a particular decision, sometimes
a number of them may be found in the course of a single opinion.
This indicates that such adjectives are used loosely, with- little
attempt at exactness in expression.
The same objections may be offered to the picturesque
phrases commonly used to describe the negligence requisite for
criminal liability They too are ambiguous. Likewise, as in the
case of the adjectives, they are used interchangeably Which
ones will appear in a particular case depends upon the casual
selection of the judge who writes the opinion.
In spite of these objections, it is believed that the use of
a descriptive word or phrase which is reasonably clear in mean-
ing would be of substantial value as an aid in the understanding
of criminal negligence.
Does our language contain a word or phrase descriptive of
the negligence requisite for criminal liability which satisfies this
requirement? If not, would it be practicable to select a word,
and subsequently a phrase embodying that word, most nearly
expressvwe of the meaning desired, and having made the select-
ion stop the loose use of other words and phrases which mani-
festly are not satisfactory 9 If the courts would consistently use
tins word or phrase, would they not in time build up a concept
for it in the criminal law which would tend to stabilize and
clarify the law? If such a concept were substantially the one
raised by a definition of the word or phrase in the dictionary,
would it not appear that the word or phrase had been well
chosen?
'See pp. 28-29, supra.
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It was with an affirmative answer to these questions in mind
that the portion of the proposed forumla embodying the phrase,
"conduct recklessly disregardful of an interest of others" was
drawn. The key word is recklessness, whether the noun, adverb,
or adjective is used. Here is a word which, though not the most
precise in connotation, nevertheless is not nearly so ambiguous
as those frequently found in the cases, and one which raises a
concept that is fairly definite and uniform in the minds of most
people. It is believed that the concept of reckless conduct most
nearly coincides with the feelings of the ordinary judge or jury
as to that negligence which merits punishment as a crime. The
term recklessness has another advantage over its rivals in being
the one most commonly employed by the courts.
The English cases have accepted this word as the one most
nearly describing the type of conduct necessary for criminal
liability through negligence. In a recent case, Andraws v. Di-
rector of Public Prosecutions,1 5s the court in discussing the
degree of negligence requisite for manslaughter said, "Probably
of all epithets that can oe applied 'reckless' most nearly covers
thd case." Archbold's Criminal Pleading, Evidence, and Prac-
tice states "Where death results in consequence of a negligent
act, it would seem that to create criminal responsibility the
degree of negligence must be so gross as to amount to reckless-
ness.' 1 59 This statement was cited with approbation in the
Canadian case, Rex v. Gretsman,'60 where the court held that
the negligence which merits punishment in the eye of the law
may be found "where a general intention to disregard the law
is shown or a reckless disregard of the rights of others. " 1 61
The word is also used in many American cases as an aid
in the description of criminal negligence. In Story v. United
States,16 2 the owner of an automobile was convicted of involun-
tary manslaughter where he permitted a drunken driver to
(1937) A.C. 576, 583.
Archbold's Pleading, Evidence, and Practice (30th ed. 1938)
903.
"4 D.L.R. 738 (1926).
'RId. at 743.
" 16 Fed. (2d) 342 (1926).
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operate his automobile resulting in the death of another. The
court said. 163
s"If the owner of a dangerous instrumentality like an automo-
bile knowingly puts that instrumentality in the immediate control of
a careless and reckless driver, sits by his side, and permits him with-
out protest so recklessly and negligently to operate the car as to
cause the death of another, he is as much responsible as the man
at the wheel."
The court, in the case of Commonwealth v. Gifl,164 made a
careful attempt to clarify the kind of negligent conduct which
gives rise to erinnal liability The defendant was charged
with involuntary manslaughter occasioned by negligent driving.
The trial court instructed that the slightest negligence was suf-
ficient to sustain a conviction. The appellate court, in holding
that a higher degree of negligence is required, observed. "It is
impracticable to attempt to define the exact degree of negligence
that must be shown to sustain a conviction, but there should be
present some element of rash or reckless conduct, which approxi-
mates acting in an unlawful manner. "165 The court went on to
say " if, one in reckless disregard (italics added) of the
rights of pedestrians leaves a deep trench across his sidewalk
unguarded,, and a pedestrian falls into it and is killed, he might
be convicted of involuntary manslaughter, for he was not regard-
ful of his social duty nor free from guilt. Such negligence would
have in it an element of recklessness and might properly be called
culpable negligence." 1 66
"' Id. at 344. "The accused has no occasion to complain of the
charge. It clearly .required the jpry, in order to convict, to find
beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused, with reckless disregard
for the safety of others, so negligently drove an automobile in a
public street as to cause the death of Mrs. Howe. One who does
such an act. is not only liable civilly in damages, but is guilty of
criminal homicide." State v. Goertz, 83 Conn. 437, 76 Atl. 1000,10062 (1910)
"Crimnal negligence is the reckless disregard of conse-
quences, or a heedless indifference to the rights and safety of others,
and a reasonable foresight that injury would probably result."
Croker v. State, 57 Ga. App. 895, 197 S. E. 92, 93 (1938).
Stephen uses the phrase, "reckless disregard" in the statement
of a hypothetical case involving manslaughter by negligence.
Stephen, Digest of the Criminal Law (1877) 163, illustration 7.
'1 120 Pa. Super. 22, 182 Atl. 103 (1935).
'Id. at 108-109. '"Tis implies, as we read it, that carelessness
or negligence resulting in death in order to be indictable as involun-
tary manslaughter, must have present in it an element of reck-
lessness. The word 'reckless,' usually imports something more than
'careless' or 'negligent.' 1d* at 108.
"Id. at 108.
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The leading decision in the state of North Carolina on crimi-
nal negligence is State v. Cope,16 7 decided in 1933. In that case
the court undertook to consider carefully whether the trial court
observed the difference between actionable and culpable negli-
gence m charging the jury Preliminary to answering this
question, the court attempted to "plot again the line, somewhat
shadowy, which separates the two." The court. was careful to
insist that culpable negligence in the law of crimes is something
more than actionable negligence in the law of torts. Then fol-
lowed the court's definition of criminal negligence -- 6 s
"Culpable negligence is such recklessness or carelessness
as imports a thoughtless disregard of consequences or a heedless in-
difference to the safety and rights of others."
The Kentucky cases utilize the word "reckless" repeatedly
to describe the quality of act requisite for criminal negligence.1 6 9
More than thirty-five years ago the Court of Appeals in that
state said :170
"It may now be regarded as well settled in this state by numer-
ous decisions of this court that when one intentionally does an act
in such a reckless and careless manner as to endanger human life,
and death ensues, he is guilty of manslaughter, although the death
of the person killed may not have been intended."
-7 204 N.C. 28, 167 S.E. 456 (1933).
" Id. at 458. In State v Roundtree, 181 N.C. 535, 106 S.E. 669,
671 (1921) the Supreme Court of North Carolina in attempting to
point out the amount of negligence necessary to hold a defendant for
manslaughter said:
"The degree of negligence necessary to be shown on an indict-
ment for manslaughter, where an unintentional killing is estab-
lished, is such recklessness or carelessness as is incompatible with a
proper regard for human life The negligence must be some-
thing more than is required on the trial of an issue in a civil action,
but it is sufficient to carry the case to the jury in a criminal prosecu-
tion where it reasonably appears that death or great bodily harm
was likely to occur A want of due care or a failure to observe
the rule of the prudent man, which proximately produces an injury,
will render one liable for damages in a civil action, while culpable
negligence, under the criminal law, is such recklessness or careless-
ness, resulting in injury or death, as imports a thoughtless disregard
of consequences, or a heedless indifference to the safety and rights
of others."
%"Even if the jury believe from the evidence that the shooting
-and killing of Ott was accidental, yet, if they believe that said acci-
dental shooting and killing was the result alone of the recklessly
careless use of a loaded, deadly pistol by defendant, they should,
notwithstanding the accident, find the defendant guilty of man-
slaughter." This extract is a part of the instructions in Chrystal v.
Commonwealth, 72 Ky. 669, 671 (1873). The appellate court held
the instructions were correct.
I York v. Commonwealth, 82 Ky. 360, 369 (1884).
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Leading texts have likewise chosen the word on a number of
occasions as an aid in the description of negligence. Wharton,
in his discussion of misadventure, employs it to distinguish an
"accident" from criminally negligent conduct -171
"Homicide by misadventure is the accidental killing of another
when the slayer is doing a lawful act unaccompanied by any crzmu-
nal carelessness or reckless conduct." (Italics are ours).
Berry, m considering the liability of one for a death result-
ing from the negligent use of an automobile, employs language
very similar to that used in the suggested formula :172
CC One who with reckless disregard for the safety of others,
so negligently drives an automobile in a public street as to cause
the death of another, is guilty of criminal homicide."
But what is the meaning of recklessness 2 Assuming that
this word most nearly describes the quality of the act requisite
in criminal negligence, what meaning is to be ascribed to it?
To be consistent one must say, "Recklessness is that negligence
which, if resulting in injury, gives rise to criminal liability,
it is the something more than want of reasonable care1 73 required
for civil liability " A search for synonyms1 74 is likely to throw
the concept back again into the realm of uncertainty
"Recklessness" is the one word chosen from a host of terms to
identify an abstract idea.
However, other means must be found to illuminate the word.
- It will not do to let the jury have the case with no aid other
'Wharton, Homicide (3rd. ed. 1907) sec. 353.
' Berry, The Law of Automobiles (5th ed. 1926) 1293.
'St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Plott, 108 Ark. 292, 157 S.W
385, 386 (1913) Siesseger v Puth, 216 Iowa 916, 248 N.W 352, 356
(1933), State v. Nevils, 330 Mo. 831, 51 S.W (2d) 47, 49 (1932)
McCoy v. Faulkenberg, 53 Ohio App. 98, 4 N.E. (2d) 281, 283 (1935).
"Tins action is founded upon recklessness, which means more
than negligence. It means proceeding without heed of, or concern
for, consequences In order for conduct to be reckless within
the meaning of the law, it must be such as to manifest a heedless
disregard for or indifference to the rights of others." Neessen v.
Armstrong, 213 Iowa 378, 239 N.W 56, 59 (1931)
'If a synonym is to be chosen perhaps "rashness" is the most
desirable. "Another sort of negligence consisted in rashness, where
a person was not sufficiently skilled in dealing with dangerous medi-
cines which should be carefully used, of the properties of which he
was ignorant, or how to administer a proper dose. A person who
with ignorant rashness, and without skill in his profession, used such
a dangerous medicine acted with gross negligence." Regina v.
Markus, 4 F & F 356, 358-359 (1864). See Commonwealth v. Gill,
120 Pa. Super. 22, 182 Atl. 103 (1935).
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than their own understanding of the meaning of recklessness.
Ways of supplementing their knowledge of the concept, of limit-
ing the length to which they might be inclined to go in individ-
ual cases, must be worked out.
In all negligence cases, civil and criminal, liability is based
upon the creation of an unreasonable risk which results in an
unintentional injury A factor in determining whether the risk
is unreasonable in a particular case is the utility of the act which
engenders the risk. When the danger to the interests of others
outweighs the utility of the act the risk becomes unreasonable and
civil liability for negligence occurs. When conduct is such that it
involves a risk to others which is not merely in excess of its utility
but is out of all proportion thereto, it becomes "recklessly dis-
regardful of the interests of others" 17 5 and criminal liability
attaches, if an injury results therefrom.
Frequently,- it is fairly easy to determine that the risk, when
weighed against the social utility of the act, is so out of pro-
portion thereto, and creates such a high degree of probability of
substantial harm17 6 without legitimate benefit, as to constitute
recklessness. Numerous cases, however, fall within a twilight
zone where it is difficult to tell from the factual situation whether
there is ordinary negligence or the "substantially higher de-
gree '"117 7 necessary for the act to merit punishment as a crime.
In such cases both judge and jury gain enlightenment by
comparing the facts of the case at issue with somewhat similar
circumstances in hypothetical situations.
The leading decision on criminal negligence, Fitzgerald v.
State,1i 7 employs the hypothetical case as a means of illustrating
the type of conduct required to sustain a conviction of man-
slaughter. The testimony for the state tended to show that the
deceased, while standing at the bar of a saloon, called attention to
a revolver lying on the back bar, whereupon the barkeeper picked
it up and shot him through the forehead. Evidence for the de-
fendant, however, tended to show that he and the dead man were
the best of friends and that the gun was accidentally discharged
in handing it across the counter. The court in instructing the
' Restatement, Torts, op. cit. supra note 100, at 739.
Id. at sec. 500.
"'Perkms, supra note 108, at 913-915.
1 112 Ala. 34, 20 So. 966 (1896).
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jury on negligence told them, in effect, that if they found the de-
fendant guilty of carelessness in any degree in handing the gun
across the counter, they would convict him of manslaughter. This
was held to be error. The appellate court pointed out that crimi-
nal liability is predicated upon "that degree of negligence or
carelessness which is denominated 'gross.' "
In order to illustrate the degree of negligence necessary for
crininal liability, the court employed some of the circumstances
involved in the case adding certain hypothetical conditions. If,
said the court, the bartender had thrown the revolver dbwn on
the counter in front of the deceased and it was thereby dis-
charged, killing him, it would be at least manslaughter in the
second degree. "But if the defendant in passing the weapon
to the deceased inadvertently held the muzzle towards him, and
it was accidentally discharged with fatal results, the defendant
would not be criminally responsible, for though that method of
handing the weapon to the deceased involved, or -may have in-
volved, carelessness, it was of too slight a degree, too trivial for
criminality to be affirmed of it. '"179
Suppose a case where the defendant set an unlabeled box
of dynamite caps down in a school yard, without apparently
appreciating the risk, while he went inside to use the telephone.
Some children found the box and while playing with it caused
the caps to explode killing one of them. Since children of tender
years were wont to use the school yard for play, it will not be
denied that the defendant was negligent. -And since a reasonable
man would consider such conduct as creating a high degree of
probability of substantial harm, out of all proportion to its
utility, it amounted to recklessness and the defendant is guilty
of manslaughter.
By a slight variation of the circumstances in the foregoing
case the dividing line between recklessness and ordinary negli-
gence can be approached. Suppose the defendant is engaged in
digging a well in one corner of the school yard and, familiar
with study hours and playground rules, knows (1) that the
children have been forbidden to play in that part of the school
yard where the work is being done, and (2) that there will not
be any play period for forty-five minutes. He sets the box
I Id. at 967.
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down in the restricted area at a time when there are no children
around, knowing that he can be back m five minutes. How-
ever, m the interimn the teacher of the third grade lets her
pupils out to play as a reward for some task well done. Some
of them violate the rule and play in the restricted part of the
yard where they find the box of caps and one of them is killed.
The defendant in the second illustration may easily be found
guilty of ordinary negligence. To leave an unlabeled box of
dynamite caps in a public place, unless necessity demands it,
probably creates an unreasonable risk to anyone who could be-
expected to come upon them there. Though it was unlikely from
the point of view of anyone in the defendant's position that any
child would be injured by the caps before he returned, still, the
fact that schedules of work and play in public schools are
generally known to be quite elastic, coupled with the fact that
children are known to frequently violate playground regulations,
plus the fact that the injury if any child did come in contact with
the box might be very serious would almost certainly brand the
defendant's conduct as negligent. However, it could hardly be-
said that his act mvolved such a high degree of probability of
substantial harm as to create liability for manslaughter.
Although the reasoning in individual adjudications does not
furnish much light as to the type of conduct necessary for
criminal negligence, the reading of a large number of decisions
basing criminal liability for assault and battery or manslaughter
upon negligence indicates that there are certain typical situatwns
which are almost certain to involve criminal responsibility if
an injury occurs. Such examples of conduct which the courts
have held repeatedly to constitute the recklessness requisite for
criminal liability are invaluable to the judge and jury for the
purpose of comparison with the facts of the case at issue.
Cases mvolving the use of dangerous agencies furnish
numerous illustrations of this. Firearms, p6isons, and auto-
mobiles hold great, potentialities for causing death or serious
bodily harm and must therefore be handled very carefully
Pointing a gun playfully at others or discharging it in the public
streets 8 0 or in a crowd 1 8 ' or dwelling house, prescribing medi-
"m Sparks v. Com., 66 Ky. 111 (1868), People v Fuller, 2 Park
Crim. Rep. (N.Y., 1823) 16.
'People v Buzan, 351 IMI. 610, 184 N.E. 890 (1933), Murphy
v. Com., 15 Ky. L. Rep. 215 (1893), State v Quick, 168 S.C. 76, 167
S.E. 19 (1932).
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eme known to be poisonous without proper caution,1s 2 and
driving an automobile upon the public streets with faulty brakes
'or at a dangerous rate of speed are examples.is 3 A defendant
who becomes involved in such situations is very likely to incur
criminal liability
c. Descrbhmg Crnmnaw Negligence as "Canduct
Deserm'ng Puntshment"
The English decisions have utilized civil negligence in a
striking way to describe criminal negligence. Civil negligence
leads, of course, to compensation by the negligent party The
English cases, following the thought expressed in the text of
Sir James Stephen, 8 4 emphasize the fact that in order to
establish criminal liability the negligence of the accused must be
such as to go "beyond a mere matter of compensation between
subjects." It must show "such disregard for the life and safety
of others as to amount to a crime against the state and conduct
deserving punishment. "185
This test, standing alone, seems without merit. Apparently
it simply leaves it to the jury as to whether the conduct of the
accused in their opinion went so far beyond civil liability as to
"deserve punishment." However, the test is not intended to
stand alone. It is used to supplement other devices indicating
the type of conduct required for conviction.
The jury have already been told about the kind of conduct
requisite for civil liability and that a higher degree of negligence
is necessary in a criminal case. This higher degree has been
described as "conduct recklessly disregardful of the interests of
others." Various tests for recklessness and phrases descriptive
of "reckless disregard" have been proposed. Comparative
situations in the decisions have been cited. This suggestion from
the English cases comes to the jury as a final injunction. It is a
sort of double check on their decision as to liability
ITessymond's Case, 1 Lewmi 169, 168 Eng. Rep. 1000 (1828)
Reg. v. Chamberlain, 10 Cox C.C. 486 (1867).
This is discussed in more detail, infra, pp. 182-185.
' 2 Stephen, op. cit. supra note 123, at 123. Rex v. Bateman,
19 Cr. App. Rep. 8, 11-12 (1925), Andrews v Director of Public
Prosecutions (1937) A.C. 576,. 582-583. Recent Canadian cases also
use this device. See note 123, supra.
IM Rex. v. Bateman, 19 Cr. App. Rep. 8, 11-12 (1925).
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The average person has a strong aversion to holding anyone
crinmnally for negligence unless his conduct is clearly deservng
of puntshment. Jurors realize that all men are negligent at times,
even themselves, and that they may have an "accident" at any
time and appear in court as defendants. Consequently, the
phrase "conduct deserving punishment" will be interpreted by
them advisedly and perhaps a trifle more conservatively than
the popular conception of recklessness.
SECTION 6. THE CHARACTER OF NEGLIGENCE
IN MURDER
Any attempt to identify and describe the negligence
requisite for murder involves a consideration of two fundamental
problems
A. The state of mind required.
B. The degree of risk necessary
A. THE STATE OF MIND REQUIRED.
Holmes takes it for granted that the state of mind is not material.
In his book on The Common Lawis 6 and in a series of cases in
which he wrote the opinions s7 he maintains that it is immaterial
whether the accused knew the danger if he was aware of circum-
stances that would lead a "man of common understanding" to
realize that the danger was very great.1 8 8
There are'valid arguments in support of the position of
Justice Holmes. It is logical in that it is a continuation in the
case of murder of the objective view of negligence which the law
takes in manslaughter and in assault and battery After all, the
objective theory requires no more than that dangerous conduct
be examined in the light of common experience. If a reasonable
man in the community would not fear the consequence of an act
he was about to commit, the prospective actor need have no hesi-
1 "It is enough that such circumstances were actually known as
would have led a man of common understanding fo infer from them
the rest of the group making up the present state of things. For in-
stance, if a workman on a house-top at nd-day knows that the
space below him is a street in a great city, he knows facts from
which a man of common understanding would infer that there were
people passing below. He is therefore bound to draw that infer-
ence, or, m other words, is chargeable with knowledge of that fact
also, whether he draws the inference or not. If then, he throws
down a heavy beam into the street, he does an act which a person
of ordinary prudence would foresee is likely to cause death, or
grievous bodily harm, and he is dealt with as if he foresaw it,
whether he does so in fact or not. If a death is caused by the act,
he is guilty of murder." Holmes, op. cit. supra note 131, at 55-56.
1"Com. v. Pierce, 138 Mass. 165, 178 (1884), Com. v. Chance,
174 Mass. 245, 252, 54 N.E. 551, 554 (1899), The Germanic, 196 U.S.
589, 596, 41 L. ed. 610, 613 (1904), Nash v. U.S., 373, 377, 57 L. ed.
1232, 1235 (1913). See Note (1939) 28 Ky. L. J. 53.
'Wechsler and Michael, supra note 76, at 710.
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tancy about going ahead. Of course, he must gauge beforehand
what a reasonable man (as determined by a jury) would do and
he acts at his peril in making this estimate, but such restraint,
while it tempers his conduct, operates in general to the social
good. If his conduct is unreasonable considering the circum-
stances and an injury results, his liability is determined by the
nature of the injury and the degree of the danger which he cre-
ates.
If his behavior is danger-creating in the highest degree, and
if it results in the death of a human being (the greatest injury
which is possible) should not the law make uniform the pattern
of negligence by imposing the sanctions prescribed for uninten-
tional murder ? It is argued that it is not so much that the pris-
oner is "whipt of-justice" as that society is justified in forcing
its members at their peril to refrain from extremely dangerous
conduct involving human life. Holmes' view of negligence is but
one phase of a complete theory of "intent" in general. The
theory is so persuasive that a competent writer has called it "the
only one which has been put forward that will bring harmony out
of the cases." "89
Stephen maintains, however, that in the case of murder the
actor must have knowledge of the danger involved in the act.1 90
'Sears, Note (1929) 23 Ill. L. Rev. 159. "It is submitted that
the point of view of Mr. Justice Holmes is the only one that has
been put forward that will bring harmony out of the cases. It is not
argued that all of the decisions may be reconciled with this theory.
After several centuries of dealing with the notion of cri.mmal intent,
general and specific, it is too much to expect that all of the results
can be reconciled with any given formula. Nor is it to be expected
that it will not receive many stratus in its application to the innum-
erable complexities of life: It is thought, however, that, if gen-
erally adopted, it would prove to be a workable system." Id. at 166.
See same writer, May, op. cit. supra note 136, at secs. 24-28.
Accord, Note (1939) 28 Ky. L. J. 53. "It is submitted that a
respectable body of authority is contained in the cases herein re-
ferred to, and that such authority sustains the conclusion that the
law views objectively the behavior of the individual. Whenever a
person's conduct is such that according to common experience there
is a strong and obvious likelihood that death will result, if death is
thereby caused, it will be murder. This will be true even though
the person responsible intended no harm, expected no harm, and in
fact was totally unaware of the probability of harm. Id. at 60.
Contra, Note (1940) 28 Ky. L. J. 474.
1 "Malice aforethought means any one or more of the follow-
ing states of mind
"(b) Knowledge that the act which causes death will probably
cause the death of, or grievous bodily harm to, some person, whether
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Tnder Holmes' theory a conviction would be possible if the ac-
cused had knowledge of aircumstances which would lead a rea-
sonable man to understand the danger.19 1
The distinction between the two views is not as pronounced
as it might appear to be. Where the actor has knowledge 'of all
the circumstances, and the knowledge of -such circumstances
would cause a reasonable man to understand the great danger
involved in doing the contemplated act, it will be a fact in most
cases that he will have actual knowledge of the danger also.
If this were true in substantially all cases it would not result
in injustice, except in rare instances, to nfer that he has knowl-
edge in each instance. Inferences of similar nature are found in
the law where the facts cannot be proved directly 192
such person is the person actually killed or not, although such
knowledge is accompanied by indifference whether death or griev-
ous bodily harm is caused or not, or by a wish that it may not be
caused." Stephen, op. cit. supra note 163, at art. 223.In The question arises whether a person who is capable of being
conscious of the circumstances will not also be conscious of the
danger, even if he does take an attitude of indifference toward it.
This is not necessarily true, it is believed.
This conclusion is premised on the fact that the mental capacity
of an individual might permit hun to be conscious of the presence
of particular ,physical phenomena more readily than it -could per-
mit him to make a logical composition of these phenomena and
derive therefrom an abstract conclusion.
For example, it seems feasible that a person may become in-
toxicated to the degree that he can be conscious of the presence
before him of a series of numbers, 3-5-7-9, and yet be unable to add
up these numbers and reach the conclusion that they total 24. Thus,
an intoxicated person may be conscious of the circumstances without
it necessarily following that he can add them up and reach the
conclusion that great danger must result.
I One of the most striking instances of this occurs in the case
of the deadly weapon doctrine. In order to secure a conviction of
intentional murder an intent must, of course, be shown. Sometimes
this may be done subjectively by presenting to the jury statements
by the defendant at the time of the killing that the act was being
done intentionally.
Often, however, the prosecution is unable to obtain such evi-
dence and is forced to rely upon objective evidence that the killing
was intentional. The deadly weapon ,doctrine has grown up in
support of such practical need. Since the use of a deadly weapon
in a deadly manner practically always indicates an actual intent to
kill or to do grievous bodily harm such intent is inferred from the
use of a deadly weapon. The accused may overcome such "inferred
malice" by evidence showing a contrary intent but he faces a dif-
ficult task. Because of this difficulty, "inferred malice" is a danger-
ous doctrine and should be limited to situations where the infer-
ence is practically certain to be correct. See 9 Wigmore, Evidence
(3rd. ed. 1940) sec. 2491 and the discussion in Perkins, supra note 2,
at 546-552.
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However, 'too high a percentage of error would result from
inferring that aft actor who has knowledge of the circumstances
has knowledge of the danger. Such an inference would be con-
trary to fact in many cases involving drunkenness and absent-
mindedness and, perhaps, in some other instances. It is in these
cases that the distinction between the views of Holmes and
Stephen becomes of practical importance.
With regard to drunkenness, the law of England is settled
that if the accused was so intoxicated as to be unaware that what
he was doing was dangerous, the homicide is manslaughter, not
murder.' 9 3
Decisions in the United States are largely in accord, 194
although there is a tendency to construe the facts so as to
escape the application of the rule. Many of the opinions are so
ambiguously written that there is a difference of opinion among
commentators as to the law.19 5
State v Massey' 96 is one of the clearer cases. The defendant,
while drunk, drove his automobile, containing four passengers
and himself, into the side of a freight tram at a railroad crossing:
The automobile was traveling forty miles an hour at the time of
the collision and the impact was so great that the car was almost
completely demolished. One passenger was killed and the others
were injured. The defendant was indicted for murder m the
first degree under a "depraved mind" statute and confined. The
case went up on an appeal by the state from an order allowing
bail.
The appellate court affirmed the ruling allowing bail. In
'Reg. v. Doherty, 16 Cox C. C. 306 (1887), King v. Meade,
(1909) 1 K. B. 895; Director of Public Prosecutions v. Beard, (1920)
A. C. 479. See the discussion in Kenny, Outlines of Criminal Law
(15th ed. 1936) 68-73.
"The following cases are contra: Reed v. State, 225 Ala. 219,
142 So. 441 (1932), Ware v. State, 47 Okla. Crin. 434, 288 Pac. 374
(1930), Cockrell v. State, - Tex. Crim. Rep. - , 117 S. W
(2d) 1105 (1938). See 5 Am. Jur. (1936) 929; Huddy, Automobiles
(8th ed. 1927) 1067.
1 Justin Miller takes the view that actual knowledge of the
danger is unnecessary if a reasonable man under the circumstances
would have known that the act was dangerous. Miller, op. cit. supra
note 108,. at 268. However, the cases cited do not support the state-
ment. See also, Tincher, The Negligent Murder (1939) 28 Ky. L. J.
53; Sears, supra note 189, at 161, fn. 9. Contra, May, op. cit. supra
note 136, at 278.
120 Ala. App. 56, 100 So. 625 (1924).
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considering the effect of the accused's intoxication upon Ins
probable guilt, the court said that evidence of Ins voluntary
drunkenness should be considered by the jury in order that they
might decide whether he was too drunk to be capable of "know-
mgly and consciously' '197 committing an act so dangerous as to
indicate a "depraved mind regardless of human life."
State v. Trott,1 9s an ambiguously written opinion, is some-
times cited1 9 9 as supporting the view of Justice Holmes. The
defendant and M, both highly intoxicated, were riding in de-
fendant's automobile. Trott relinquished the driver's position to
M telling him to "get on the wheel and get away" In breach of
three statutes, and with reckless disregard of the public safety,
MV ran the car on a main street, after dark, at the rate of fifty or
sixty miles an hour. He crashed into another machine killing one
person and imperiling the lives of six or eight others.
The defendant contended that the fumes of the liquor had so
stupefied his brain that he fell asleep and consequently was not
directing the operation of the automobile when the accident oc-
curred. He was convicted of second degree (common law)
murder and appealed. The appellate court affirmed the judgment.
The lower court had charged that Trott would not be guilty
"unless he turned the operation of the car over to M before he
became incapable of knowing what he was doing." Since the
jury found him guilty, it may be stated as a fact that he knew
the danger at that time.
"' Another case -indicating that conscious knowledge of the dan-
ger is required to constitute a depraved mind is Hyde v. State, 230
Ala. 243, 160 So. 237, 238 (1935), in which the court said:
"If the defendant intentionally ran the car into the Austin
or acted with such conscious r6cklessness as defined above,
then the defendant's acts were unlawful and done without
3ust cause or legal excuse, which may constitute malice
within the meamng of murder in the second degree, or at
least the jury could reasonably draw such conclusions."
Accord, Tarver v. State, 90 Tenn, 485, 16 S. W 1041, 1044
(1891).
See also Commonwealth v. Mayberry, 290 Pa. 195, 138 Atl., 686;.
688 (1927), where the court stated:
"It is rarely that the facts in a motor vehicle accident will
sustain a charge of murder. The element of malice is
usually missmg. 'There must be a consciousness of peril or
probable peril to human life imputed to the operator of a
car before he can be held for murder."'
190 N. C. 674, 130 S. E. 627 (1925).
ITincher, supra note 195, at 58; Turner, Note (1940) 28 Ky.
L. J. 474, 476-477.
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The Trott Case is illustrative of the reason for the ambig-
uity in so many of the cases where the defendant has been
drinking. Courts and juries have a tendency, while rendering
lip service to the rule that the defendant must have knowledge
of the danger in order to be guilty of murder, to join in'holding
that an intoxicated man has such knowledge so long as he is
conscious of what he is doing. The tenor of thought which runs
through most of the opinions is found in such expressions as
"although intoxicated, he was not irresponsible
' 200 and
"though drunk, defendant was not oblivious to what was going
on. '"201 It seems to be the attitude of the courts generally, that
although drunkenness may make a man act with wanton disre-
gard of the lives of others, it does not often deprive him com-
pletely of his power to think and act.20 2 As a psychological fact,
this is probably true.
What conclusion is to be drawn as to the necessity of knowl-
edge of the danger in the case of the negligent murder? It is
believed that Stephen's view is the better one. The following
reasons are offered in support of this determination
=State v. Trott, 190 N. C. 674, 130 S. E. 627, 630 (1925).
'State v. Shepard, 171 Minn. 414, 214 N. W 280, 281 (1927).
wIn State v Weltz, 155 Minn. 143, 193 N. W 42 (1923), the
defendant, a single man, aged 37, owned a Cadillac car. On the
afternoon of the tragedy he drove around on several errands ac-
compamed by a Mrs. Alma Walker. About dusk he stopped and
went into a place to get a glass of "root beer", leaving the woman
in the car. When he did not return in thirty minutes, she sent a
police officer in to ask him to come out. When he came out he
was so intoxicated that she refused to ride in the car with him
and he drove off alone at a high rate of speed.
Later he ran through a group of four people who were cross-
ing a street, killing- one, a woman. He fled from the scene of the
accident pursued by police officers on motorcycles. It was necessary
for the police to club him in order to subdue him when he was
finally captured. One police officer described him as so drunk that
he did not know what he was doing; another described him as
crazy drunk; and a third as '"looking crazy."
Weltz was convicted of murder in the third degree and ap-
pealed. The court in affirming the conviction held that his acts
evinced a depraved mind. In discussing the issue of drunkenness-
the court said:
"Intoxication may temporarily arouse passions and paralyze
the will, without depriving its victim of the power to dis-
tinguish between right and wrong and to comprehend the
nature of his acts. It would seem that the defendant was in
that condition mentally when he ran over Mrs. Peabody."
Id. at 44.
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(1) His view is supported by precedent. The common law,
modern English decisions and the great weight of authority in
the United States are in accord with his position.
(2) Holmes' view is more severe than public opinion ap-
proves.
As Holmes himself says in another connection, "The first
requirement of a sound body of law is, that it should correspond
with the actual feelings and demands of the community, whether
right or wrong." 2 03 It is believed that the public conscience does
not approve of carrying the objectivity of negligence to the
point of inflicting the penalties for murder upon an actor who
negligently kills another without knowledge of the danger in his
act even though the amount of risk created is sufficiently great
to raise the offense to that grade. Manslaughter is the highest
penalty commonly inflicted upon such an individual.
Consider the case of the absent-minded professor. A typical
absent-minded professor leaves his classroom after a particularly
stimulating lecture. A student has raised an interesting and
difficult question. The professor enters Ins automobile to drive
home still engrossed in thought. He should keep his mind upon
his driving but he continues to think of the problem.
Such conduct is frequent in the case of this professor. He
often does this sort of thing when he is engrossed in a difficult
question.2
0 4
On the day in question he unintentionally kills a pedestrian
while driving absent-mindedly and in a manner which a jury
would consider as "evincing a depraved mind" in the case of an
attentive individual. He is liable criminally But is he guilty of
murder?
Of course not all absent-minded individuals who commit
negligent homicides merit the forbearance which the average
court and jury are likely to feel toward the professor who is in
most respects a "good citizen," although he does not take cog,
nizance of his infirmity
2Holmes, op. cit. supra note 136, at 41.
' 'erefore he has knowledge of his propensity to be absent-
minded.
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Assume a situation in which the actor, a successful dental
surgeon with a family, has become involved with a woman of
low character. This Delilah is going to have a baby by hin and
threatens exposure unless he will divorce his wife and marry her.
Either alternative, of course, means professional and social
ruin for the man. Distracted by worry, he absent-mindedly ad-
ministers a greatly excessive dose of anaesthetic, thereby killing
a patient.
20 5
Such a situation raises the question whether the actor's fault
in creating the condition which causes him to be unaware of the
danger is a deciding factor. For example, it might be argued
that the fact that it was the fault of the accused that he was
drunk is a deciding factor in the cases which hold an intoxicated
defendant guilty of murder. It is believed that it is not. This is
indicated by the fact that most intoxicated defendants who
commit negligent killings are convicted of manslaughter, not
murder. And when the conviction is for murder, the great
majority of cases hold that knowledge of the danger is required,
the fact that the accused was voluntarily drunk -will not substi-
tute for that requirement.
However, the defendant's drunkenness or other faults may
assist the prosecution in convicting him of murder in another
way In order to convict a defendant of a negligent murder it is
necessary to show that he is guilty of brute-like conduct. He
must have "a depraved mind and a heart devoid of social duty "
These phrases represent a fairly accurate, though picturesque,
statement of the law
Drunkenness is often one of the "circumstances" contribut-
ing to the "depravity" of the accused. Ordinarily the defendant
may be an individual who conforms reasonably well to the
standards of the community but liquor may make a demon of
hum.
There are several stages of drunkenness. 20 6 The conduct of
I Or, suppose the same facts, except that the actor is a labor-
mg man instead of a successful dentist. Beset by his worries, he
absent-mindedly throws a heavy beam off the roof of a high build-
mg upon which he is working. The building is on a densely popu-
lated thoroughfare m a large city and a passerby is killed. See
the discussion m Turner's Note, supra note 199, at 475-477.
"Hence the familiar division into four successive stages-
jocose, bellicose, lachrymose, comatose." Kenny, op. cit. supra note
193, at 72,. fn. 2.
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the belligerent drunk is apt to be outrageous. He seeks an op-
poitunity to start a fight. If he is driving an automobile, he
takes a savage pleasure in frightening everyone on the highway,
including his own passengers. As a matter of fact such an in-
dividual has knowledge of the danger 20 7 but cares nothing for
the consequences. He ias become depraved. His state of mind, as
well as his conduct, is brutal. The test is partly subjective in the
negligent murder.
Mayes v PeopZe,20 8 a leading case, presents the type of
actor who should be convicted of murder under this analysis. 20 9
The defendant came home intoxicated and in a belligerent mood
but conscious of all that was taking place. 2 10 He attempted to
throw a loaf of bread at his wife and did hurl a tin cup at his
child. When his wife attempted to leave the room to go to bed he
hurled a large beer glass at her. She was carrying an oil lamp
and the glass broke it scattering burning oil over her and caus-
ing her death. The trial court instructed that if all the circum-
stances showed an abandoned and malignant heart, the defendant
would be guilty of murder, regardless of an actual intent to hit
her with the beer glass. The appellate court held that there was
no error in the instructions.
It may be concluded that it is necessary in most jurisdictions
that the accused have knowledge of the danger, if he is to be
convicted of a negligent murder. Cases involving drunkenness
have satisfied the requirement by holding that the actor has such
knowledge if he is conscious of what he is doing. Convictions of
murder in such cases are not common, however, since the cir-
cumstances are usually not strong enough to indicate a "de-
praved mind and a heart devoid of social duty"
Cases involving absent-mindedness present a more difficult
problem. If the absent-minded individual is so preoccupied as
not to have present knowledge of the danger, it is believed that
he cannot be guilty of murder.
'Assuming that he is still conscious of what he is doing.
106 11. 306 (1883).
See also State v. Weltz, 155 Minn. 143, 193 N. W 42 (1923)
and State v. Shepard, 171 Minn. 414, 214 N. W 280 (1927).
106 M. 306, 310 (1883).
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B. THE DEGREE OF RISK NECESSARY.
In all negligence cases, civil and criminal, liability is based
primarily upon the unreasonableness of the risk involved in the
act causing the injury The magnitude of the risk required to
create civil liability is based upon this factor, considering the
utility of the act and the other "circumstances" of the par-
ticular case. To raise the risk involved to the magnitude re-
quired for assault and battery or manslaughter the situation
must be such that a substantially greater amount of risk is in-
volved than is necessary to create civil liability 211
The same ascending scale continues in the case of murder. A
relatively higher degree of risk is required than is sufficient to
sustain a conviction of manslaughter. In addition, in the case of
murder, a subjective element is introduced by the requirement
that the actor have knowledge of the danger.
This ascending scale may be illustrated by the following
diagram showing the various divisions of the "carelessness-
danger" line. The additional, subjective factor required in
murder is also indicated in C, under (2), which appears below
the line.
CARELESSNESS-DANGER
A. Ordinary or Civil B. Negligence Re-
Negligence quired for As-
sault an d Bat-
tery and Man-
slaughter
Conduct creating Conduct creating a
danger which is un- substantial1r "higher
reasonable under the degree" of danger
circumstances. O b- Objective standard.
jectrve standard.
The degree of danger increases in this di-
rection from X towards Y.
LINE.
C. Negligence Re-
quired for Murder
(1) Conduct creat-
ing an extremely
high degree of dan-
ger. Objective stand-
ard.
f I
(2) Knowledge of the
danger in the act.
Subjective standard.,
Various words and phrases have been used by legislatures,
commentators, and judges to describe the extremely high degree
of danger required in the case of the negligent murder. The
phrase which appears most often in modern statutes and decis-
ions describes the conduct required as "imminently dangerous
to others. ' 212 According to Stephen, the actor must have knowl-
Discussed supra, at pp. 127-139.2t2Wechsler and Michael, supra note 76, at 705, fn. 18.
X ,%"
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edge that his act "will probably cause death or grievous bodily
harm. "213 It is the opimon of Michael and Wechsler that it is
commonly thought that the accused must be guilty of conduct
constituting "extremely gross recklessness. "214
Such phrases, like the ones used to describe the negligence re-
quired for assault and battery and for manslaughter, are helpful
but not satisfying. All are ambiguous. While there is not the
infinite variety of them that is found in the lower grade of
criminal negligence, they are sufficient in number to cause con-
fusion and uncertainty
1. Describing the Negligence Required for Murder by
Using the Phrase, "Conduct Wantonly Disregardful
of the Lives and Safety of Others."
In the case of the lesser offenses grounded on criminal
negligence, it has been suggested that the discontinuance of such
ambiguous words and phrases and the selection of a descriptive
word or phrase, reasonably clear in meaning and most nearly
embodying the concept desired, would make for clarity and
stability in the law.2
15
It is with like considerations in mind that the phrase, "con-
duct wantonly disregardful of the lives and safety of others" is
now proposed as descriptive of the type of behavior required in
the case of the negligent murder. The key word is wantonness,
whether the noun, adverb, or adjective is used.
The word, while not the most precise, is not nearly as am-
biguous as others used to describe the conduct required and it
raises a concept which is reasonably definite in most minds. It
is believed, also, that the ordinary concept of wanton conduct is
the one which most nearly coincides with the opinion of the
average judge and jury as to the kind of behavior which is re-
quired to secure a conviction of murder.
There is a further advantage in selecting the word "wan-
ton" in that it is already in use by the courts as one of the means
used to describe the conduct requisite for the negligent mur-
der.2 16 However, as in the case of other words and phrases
3 Stephen, op. cit. supra note 3, at 22. /
"'Wechsler and Michael, supra note 76, at 709.
See the discussion, supra, pp. 128-130.
1 State v. Shepard, 171 Minn. 414, 214 N. W 280, 282 (1927);
Com. v. Mayberry, 290 Pa. 195, 138 Atl. 686, 688 (1927).
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employed to describe criminally dangerous conduct, it has not
been used precisely by the courts.
217
What is the meaning of wantonness9 Assuming that the
word is selected as the one best describing the quality of mind
and act necessary to secure a conviction of murder for the un-
-intentional killing of a human being through negligence, what
meaning is to be ascribed to it' Here again, as m the case of
"recklessness, ' 2 18 too great a search for similar words, all of
which are more or less dissimilar, is likely to lead to ambiguity
instead of understanding.
One of the most satisfactory defilnitions of wantonness is
found in the dictionary, where it is defined as "arrogant reck-
lessness. '"219 Phrased m terms of recklessness, .the word which
has been selected as descriptive of the behavior required for the
lower grade of criminal negligence,2 20 the addition of the ad-
jective is indicative of the "still higher" degree of danger and
the "depraved mind" required in the case of murder.
But neither the word "wanton" nor any formula 22 1 em-
ploying it is suffcient to describe fully the negligence required
for murder. Such descriptive words and formulae are but
machinery used to reduce difficult legal problems so that they
may be more easily grasped.2 22 Additional devices for interpret-
ing them to courts and juries must be worked out.
= The fact that the word is used loosely by the courts is in-
dicated by the fact that it is usually linked with words which are
not synonyms. Wanton and reckless are often coupled. Jones v.
Com., 213 Ky. 356, 281 S. W 164, 167 (1926). The same court has
used reckless, wanton, and gross as synonyms. Pelfrey v. Com.,
247 Ky. 484, 57 S. W (2d) 474, 476 (1933). Reckless, mischievous,
and wanton are used in State v. Shepard, 171 Minn. 414, 214 N. W
280, 282 (1927). Wantonly and wickedly are found in Com. v.
Mayberry, 290 Pa. 195, 138 Ati. 686, 688 (1927). The courts often
use the word "wanton" to describe the conduct required in the
case of the negligent manslaughter. Barkley v. State, 165 Tenn.
309, 54 S. W (2d) 944 (1932), Curlette v. State, 25 Ala. App.
179, 142 So. 775 (1932).
'See the discussion, supra, page 133.
='Webster's New Int. Dict. (2nd. ed. 1938) 2871.
'- See the discussion, supra, at page 130.
22 The negligence required in murder is conduct creating such
an unreasonable risk of harm to the lives and safety of others as io
be wantonly disregardful of such interests. The actor must have
knowledge of the danger. The standard of conduct to be applied
is that of a reasonable man under like circumstances.
Green, supra note 97, at 1030-1031.
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2. Describzng the negligence requred for murder by com-
paring it with mntentional msconduct.
In an attempt to secure a more definite conception df the
meaning of wantonness as used in the negligent murder cases, it
is of advantage to distinguish it from intentional wrong-doing.
This distinction is indicated in the following negligence-intention
outline which recognizes five distinct types of conduct
(a) Conduct involving the "ordinary negligence" requisite for
civil liability.
(b) Conduct constituting the "higher degree of negligence"
called recklessness required for assault and battery and
manslaughter."
(c) Conduct embracing the "still higher degree of negligence"
called wantonness and indicating the "abandoned and
malignant heart" required for murder.
(d) Conduct involving consequences "substantially certain" to
follow from the act. Such consequences are "intended"
regardless of desire that they occur. '-
(e) Conduct involving consequences desired by the actor.
This outline gives a "working distinction" between negli-
gence and intent. The different classes of negligence are found
in divisions (a), (b), and (c), the kinds of "intent" in divisions
(d) and (e) Thus, in border-line cases the difference between
wanton misconduct and intentional wrongdoing is the difference
between the doing of an act which is "substantially certain" to
result in injury (intentional) and the doing of one which is
"extremely dangerous," evincing a depraved mind (wantonly
negligent) When the degree of known danger reaches the point
where injury is substantially certain to occur the act is no longer
wantonly negligent, it becomes intentional, as a matter of law.,
3. Acts which the courts have held to be ivanton.
Another helpful device for interpreting the meaning of
wantonness is the tabulation of the kinds of acts which the courts
have considered to be extremely dangerous and to evince a de-
praved mind. The following is a list of typical situations where
the act is likely to be wantonly negligent
="In Pennsylvania, a greater degree of -recklessness is re-
quired for battery than for manslaughter. Com.. v. Bergen, 134 Pa.
Super. 62, 4 At. .(2d) 164 (1939). Ordinarily there is no difference
between these two crimes in this respect." Hall, Assault and Battery
by the Reckless Motorist (1940) 31 J. Crnn. L. 133, 134.
SIbid., Perkins, supra note 108, at 910-911. See Restatement,
Torts, op. cit. supra note 100, at sec. 500, comment f.
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(a) Shooting snto a train.
To fire into a train, passenger or freight, is an act of wanton
negligence. The leading case is Banks v. State,22 5 where the de-
fendant, a negro, while walking along a dirt road near a railroad
track with a party of colored companions, fired into a moving
freight train and killed a negro brakeman. It does not appear
that either the defendant or any member of his party was ac-
quainted with any of the persons on the train. His confession,
introduced in evidence, indicates his mental state. He deposed :226
" Davis said, 'Less shoot into that tram,' and I said,
'No, Less don't do that.'"
His own statement indicates that he fully appreciated the
extreme danger of such an acit. 2 2 7 It was wholly wanton, "arro-
gantly reckless." As the court said, "That man who can
coolly shoot into a moving train, or automobile, or other vehicle
in which are persons guiltless of any wrongdoing toward him or
provocation for such attack, is, if possible, worse than the man
who endures insult and broods over a wrong, real or fancied, and
then waylays and kills his personal enemy " He was held guilty
of murder.
(b) Firzng tnto a crowd.
It is well settled that where a person shoots into a crowd of
people in disregard of consequences and a death results there-
from, he is guilty of murder.
228
(c) Firing into a dwelling house.
If a person intentionally discharges a firearm into a dwelling
in which he has reason to believe persons are living, thereby kill-
ing someone, he is guilty of murder.
2 29
-85 Tex. Crim. Rep. 165, 211 S. W 217 (1919). Aiken v. State,
10 Tex. App. 610 (1881).
:'Id. at 218.
The confession of Davis, one of Bank's compamons, is still
more indicative of the wantonness of the act. See Davis v. State,
85 Tex. Crm. Rep. 163, 211 S. W 589, 590 (1919).
'Baily v. State, 133 Ala. 155, 32 So. 57 (1901), Pool v. State,
87 Ga. 526, 13 S. E. 556 (1891), Smith v. State, 124 Ga. 213, 52
S. E. 329 (1905), Brown v. Com., 13 Ky. L. Rep. 372, 17 S. W 220
(1891) State v. Young, 50 W Va. 96, 40 S. E. 334 (1901).
'Washington v. State, 60 Ala. 10, 31 Am. Rep. 28 (1877);
People v. Jernatowski, 238 N. Y. 188, 144 N. E. 497- (1924), State v.
Capps, 134 N. C. 622, 46 S. E. 730 (1904) Russell v. State, 38 Tex.
Crim. Rep. 590, 44 S. W 159 (1898).
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(d) Other instances of wantonness.
There are a number of other instances where the act is likely
to be wanton. It is extremely dangerous to fire into an auto-
mobile which is occupied. There are a number of cases where
peace officers have done so when drivers refused to halt at their
commands.
2 30
Watchmen for railroads and private concerns having coal,
flour, lumber, or other commodities on cars or stored in yards
or buildings are notoriously wanton in their use of firearms
against trespassers. It is true that the problem is a difficult one
but life is more valuable than property, and generally, xelief can
be obtained by other means than by the wanton shooting of the
trespasser.
There are numerous isolated instances where the act is ar-
rogantly reckless because of its potential danger. In such cases
one can usually read the facts, visualize the situation and im-
mediately perceive the wantonness of the conduct. Studst Il
v. State2 Sl is illustrative of this type of situation, although there
are many variations. In that case the defendant, his brother,
and another boy were together when the deceased, a neighbor
boy about fifteen years of age, appeared some two hundred yards
away The defendant's brother had an old gun which he gave
to the third person, both brothers stating that the gun would
not hit a beef at fifteen steps. The gun was fired, causing the
boy's death. The court, on appeal from a judgment of murder
in the second degree, held that the act to which the defendant
was an accomplice was one naturally tending to destroy life and
affirmed the judgment.
By way of summary, it may be concluded that liability in
the case of the negligent murder, as in all negligence, rests pri-
marily upon the unreasonableness of the risk taken considering
the social utility of the act. The negligent murder differs from
other negligence, however, in that actual knowledge of the danger
is necessary--a subjective requirement.
I Wiley v. State, 19 Arz. 346, 170 Pac. 869 t1918); Ex parte
Finney, 21 Okla. Crun. Rep. 103, 205 Pac. 197 (1922).
= 7 Ga. 2 (1849). See Holt v. State, 89 Ga. 316, 15 S. E. 316
(1892).
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The kind of negligent conduct reqmsite 'for murder -is best
described as "wanton." Wanton conduct is behavior involving
known danger of -such. extremely high degree as to indicate that
the actor is arrogantly reckless towards the lives and safety of
thers,-that he .has a ".depraved mind." Such behavior is to
be distinguished from intentional misconduct, but wheu the de-
gree of known danger reaches the point where injury is sub-
stantially certain to occur the- act -becomes intentional: as a
matter of law.
Acts which have been held sufficiently wanton to merit a
conviction of murder include shooting into a tram, into a crowd;
into a dwelling house, or into an automobile containing passen-
gers. In such cases the risk is very great. From the standpoint .of
societal harm, some of them contain as much danger as ihough
the miseonduct were intentional. In addition, the mental atti-
tude of the defendant is reprehensible. There is little difference
between a positive design to kill and the commission of an act
so wanton as to indicate that the actor does not care whether or
not he kills. Society is justified in holding such an individual
guilty of murder, if a killing occurs as a result of such repre-
hensible misconduct.
SECTION 7 THE IMPORTANCE OF THE "CIRCUM-
STANCES OF THE CASE" IN THE-DETERMINATION
OF CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE
Formulas for negligence, civil and criminal, provide, "The
standard of conduct 'to be applied is that of a reasonable man
under like circumstances. ' 2 32 Thus, while an objective stand-
ard2 33 is adopted in the selection of the "reasonable man" as
the norm in the determination of whether a defendant is negli-
gent, it is made concrete and capable of being applied to the
particular facts of the specific case by placing this fictitious per-
son under the same circumstances as the actor. Consequently, the
"circumstances of the case" have a direct bearing upon the de-
termination of negligence.
There are numerous variations in the "circumstances" in
negligence cases. Defendants are blind, crippled, stupid, or
nervous. They are infants, afflicted with insanity, or possessed
of expert knowledge.. The weather is cloudy, clear, hot, cold, or
rainy. Injuries result from the use of such divergent instru-
mentalities as swords, poison, dynamite, firearms, or automobiles.
These varied factors may be classified as subjective circumstances
(characteristics of the actor) and objective circumstances (char-
acteristics of the environment) 234
A. Subjective Circumstances (Characteristics of the Actor)
Ordinarily, the law does not excuse or make special pro-
visions for the actor who does not come up to the standard of the
"reasonable man" in his personal characteristics, mental and
physical. Conversely, it does not force him to measure up to a
higher standard if his capacities are greater than those of the
norm. The standard of conduct is an objective one and the law
takes no account of the variations of the individual from the
standard.
See supra pp. 32-34; page 32, fi. 129; page 150, fn. 221.
As Professor Edgerton points out, the adoption of an objective
standard in the selection of the "reasonable man" as the norm in
the determination of negligent conduct must not be confused with
the adoption of an objective standard in the determination that
negligence is conduct, not a state of mind. Edgerton, supra note
134, at 849-850z The second question has been discussed, supra,
at-pp. 34-41.
Wechsler and Michael, supra note--76, at. 746.
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The most satisfactory explanation of this is that it is one
of the prices men pay for living together in a compact society
Individual idiosyncrasies and peculiarities must be accommo-
dated to the common mold. A sacrifice of individual character-
istics which go beyond a certain point is necessary in a well-
ordered community "If, for instance," as Justice Holmes
points out, "a man is born hasty and awkward, is always having
accidents and hurting himself or his neighbors, no doubt his
congenital defects will be allowed for in the courts of Heaven,
but his slips are no less troublesome to his neighbors than if they
sprang from guilty neglect. His neighbors accordingly require
him, at his peril, to come up to their standard, and -the courts
which they establish decline to take his personal equation into
account. "1235
There are, however, certain classes of "extreme ab-
normals" 2 36 to whom it would be manifestly unfair to apply the
usual objective test. This has resulted in several exceptions to
the rule that every actor is forced at his peril to conform to the
standard of the ordinary prudent man under the circumstances.
In two instances such exceptions are occasioned by the fact that
individuals in the class fall so far below the norm that a separate
standard is employed. In one instance the exception is caused by
the fact that the capacity of persons in the class is so much
greater than the "average" that a separate standard is justifi-
able. Infants and, perhaps, insane persons fall into the first
classification, experts into the second.
1. Infants
The law does not hold infants to the same standard of care
that it demands of adults. Lemency toward children, occasioned
by their physical and mental immaturity and lack of experience,
is common in both the civil and crnmnial law.
There are very few cases where children are made defend-
ants in civil actions for negligence. 2 37 Although it is well estab-
Holmes, op. cit. supra note 131, at 108.
Green, supra note 97, at 1039.
-7Brese v. Maechtle, 146 Wis., 89, 130 N. W 893 (1911), is a
leading case dealing with an infant's civil liability for harm negli-
gently done by hnn. The plaintiff, a boy about ten years old, and
the defendant, a boy of the same age, attended the same school,
and were friends. The plaintiff was playing the time-honored game
of marbles in the school yard at recess. Just as he was kneeling to
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lished that a minor is responsible for compensatory damages
resulting from his torts, those who have claims against children
realize that a judgment against a child is generally valueless.
Most of the discussions as to the standard of care required of
children are to be found in cases where the plea of contributory
negligence was interposed where children or their parents or
representatives were seeking recovery for injuries alleged to be
caused by the negligence of an adult. Consequently, if a rule
is to be deduced from a reasonable number of decisions, it is
necessary to state the standard of conduct required of infants
as it is indicated by the analogy of contributory negligence
23 8
in these cases.
For the purpose of determining liability in torts, children
are placed in categories, depending upon their age, intelligence,
and experience. 239 The particular child is held, objectively,
240
shoot, the defendant came running around the schoolhouse, being
chased by another boy and inadvertently ran into the plaintiff,
knocking him over and injuring his eyes so badly that the sight was
destroyed. The appellate court held that the defendant was only
required to exercise the care which the "great mass of children of
the same age ordinarily exercise under the same crcumstances, tak-
mg into account the experience, capacity, and understanding of
the child." See Charbonnau v. MacRury et al., 84 N. H. 501 (1931);
Bullock v. Babcock, 3 Wend. (N. Y.) 391 (1829), Note (1931) 79
U. of Pa. L. Rev. 1153.
"There may be some doubt as to whether it is correct to
regard contributory negligence and negligence as sufficiently analo-
gous to make one a safe basis for statements in regard to the other.
It may be that children should not be required to conform to a
'particular standard in order to relieve an admittedly negligent de-
fendant from liability to them. It does not necessarily follow that
a child should not be required to conform to a higher standard of
behaviour where it is necessary for the protection of innocent mem-
bers of the public. On the whole, however, the contributory negli-
gence cases do not seem to show an undue regard for the in-
evitable inferiorities of children and therefore it is probably safe
to accept the standard to which a child must conform to avoid lia-
bility for harm caused to innocent outsiders as substantially the
same as that to which he must conform to be free from contributory
negligence." Restatement, Torts (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1929), sec.
167, -special note.
I "If the child is of sufficient age, intelligence, and experience
to realize the harmful potentialities of a given situation, he is re-
quired to exercise such prudence in caring for himself and such
consideration for the safety of others as is common to children of
like age, intelligence and experience. The fact that a child is habitu-
ally reckless of the safety of himself and others to a degree unusual
in similar children, does not excuse hun." Restatement, Torts, op.
cit. supra note 100, at see. 283, comment e.
Although the standard for children has been stated with cer-
tainty as to the factors to be considered in determining whether a
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to the standard demanded of one of his class. The usual state-
ment is that a child is to be judged by the conduct reasonably to
be expected from one of his age, intelligence, and experience,
considering the circumstances.
2 41
It is impossible to fix a definite age at which children are
capable of being negligent. 24 2 This is largely because children of
particular child is or is not negligent, there is considerable confusion
in the cases on the question. The courts, rather loosely, use quite a
number of' factors, such as ability, age, capacity, discretion, ex-
perience, intelligence, judgment, knowledge, maturity, sex, and un-
derstanding. See the cases collected in annotation, LLR.A. 1917 F
10, 13-41; Shulman, The Standard of Care Required of Children
(1928) 37 Yale L. J. 618, 620-621. The combination selected is, it
is submitted, not only the most frequent one, it is also the most
logical.
W "The mental capacity, the knowledge and experience of the
particular child, are to be taken into consideration in each case.
These qualities are individualized-subjective--but only for the
purpose of determining whether or not the child was capable of per-
ceiving the risk of injury to himself and of avoiding the danger.
Beyond that, there is an objective standard. In determining
whether or not his conduct was proper in view of his intelligence,
knowledge and experience, his conduct is to be compared with that
of the careful and prudent child of similar qualities. Just as in the
case of adults, one of the qualities of the standard 'reasonable man'
is consistent carefulness or prudence, so in the case of infants, the
element of prudence is standardized." Shulman, op. cit. supra note
239, at 625. But see Green, op. cit. supra note 97, at 1039, n. 25.
"'Felton v. Aubrey, 74 Fed. 350 (1896); Kinnare v. Chicago
& N. W A. Co., 114 Ill. App. 230 (1904), Grenell v. Michigan, C. R.
Ry. Co., 124 Mich. 141, 82 N. W 843 (1900), Spillane v. Missouri
P R. Co., 135 Mo. 414, 37 S. W 198 (1896), Qunn v. Ross Motor
Car Co., 157 Wis. 543, 147 N. W 1000 (1914) Cromeenes v. San Pedro,
L. A. & S. L. R. Co., 37 Utah 475, 109 Pac. 10 (1910). Note (1941)
29 Ky. L. J. 334.
" Of course, a child may be so young as to be clearly incapable
of the requisite intelligence and experience necessary to enable
him to perceive the dangers inherent in a particular situation. But
what age marks the 'dividing line between capacity and incapacity9
Assume that a child of three is too young to have the requisite
capacity. What about a child four years old? Or five? Since it
is mpossible to name a dividing line which might apply reasonably
well to all children it is better not to attempt to name an arbitrary
age below which a child is incapable of negligence.
However, this has been done in numerous cases. The general
rule is well settled that a child under three years of age is can-
clusively presumed not to have the requisite capacity. As regards
children between three and five, the weight of authority remains
the same, but a number of courts have taken the position that the
question of capacity is for the jury. The number of cases adopt-
mg that position increases as the child grows older. There are a
number of' states that draw an analogy to crimes to aid them in
setting an arbitrary age limit of seven years. Wilderman, Presump-
tions Existing in Favor of the Infant zn Re: The Question of an
'Infant's Ability, to be. Guilty of Contributory Negligence (1935) 10
Ind..L. Rev., 427; Annotation,_L.R.A. 1917 F 10, 54-73; (1928) 26
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the same age vary greatly in the other two decisive factors, in-
telligence and experience. A child of six may have more
intelligence and perception than one of eight, one of seven more
experience with the dangers of a particular situation than one
of twelve. Indeed, a particular child of nine may have the in-
telligence or experience or both to appreciate the dangers of one
situation but not of another In the first situation he would be
liable for the resulting injury, in the second he- would not be
liable.
2 43
However, age ts the decisive factor in. the determination of
liability in criminal cases, where the defendant, a minor, is
accused of negligence. Here, as elsewhere in the crimnal law,
the capacity of infants for the commission of crime is determined
according to three well-recognized age groups.
At common law there is a conclusive presumption that a
child under seven years does not have the capacity to commit
crime.24 4 In some states statutes have -changed the common law
rule.
24 5
Between the ages of seven and fourteen there is a pre-
sumption that an infant lacks criminal capacity 2 46 The accused
Mich. L. Rev. 811-812; (1939) 37 Mich. L. Rev. 970; (1931) 15 Minn.
L. Rev. 834-835; (1936) 15 N. C. L. Rev. 75; (1927) 2 Wash. L.
Rev. 204-205; (1937) 44 W Va. L. Rev. 55.
At the other extreme, there are children who have not yet
attained their majority,'who are as capable as adults of having the
capacity to be negligent. It has been suggested that it would be the
better practice to set a particular age at which the adult standard
would apply, such as seventeen or eighteen. (1939) 17 Tex. L. Rev.
506. There is a certain amount of logic in the suggestion. However,
this is deemed inadvisable, since most individuals under 21 lack
the experience and judgment to enable them to exercise the' degree
of care necessary in many situations.
I' Restatement, Torts,. op. cit. supra n6te 100 at see. 283, com-
ment e.
'Heilman v. Com., 84 Ky. 457, 1 S. W 731 (1886); Com. v.
Mead, 10 Allen (Mass.) 398 (1865), State v. Guild, 10 N.J.L. 163
(1828). 2 Stephen, op. cit. supra note 123 at 97-99; 1 Wharton,
Criminal Law (11th ed. 1912) See. 85; Annotation (1905) 36 L.R.A.
196; Note (1932) 7 St. John's Law Rev. 82.
'Ark. Stat. (Pope, 1937) See. 2927; Dove v. State, 37 Ark.
261 (1881) (12 yrs.). Ann. Code, Ga. (Park, 1914) Sec. 34; Ford
v. State, 100 Ga. 63, 25 S. E. 845 (1896) (10 yrs.). Ill. Rev. Stat.
(1937) Chap. 38, Sec. 591; Angelo v. State, 96 Ill. 209 (1880) (10
yrs.).
20 Godfrey v. State, 31 Ala. 323 (1858), Willett v. Com., 13
Bush (Ky.) 230 (1877); Com. v. Mead, 10 Allen (Mass.) 398
(1865). -Cf. State v. Learnard, 41 Vt. 585 (1869) (no presumption),
Reg. v. Smithl- Cox C. C. 260 (1845) (no presumption) For statu-
tory modification, see Note (1933) 3 Brooklyn L. Rev. 293.
KENTUcKY LAW JOURNAL
must first make a showing that he is within the age limits. Then,
the burden of going forward with evidence to show that he has
capacity is upon the prosecution.
2 4 7
At common law children over fourteen years of age are in
substantially the same position as adults as regards their capacity
to commit crime.2 4 8 The rule is as harsh as it sounds.
2 4 9 It
appears that any abnormalities having to do with lack of capac-
ity are appropriately made under the defense of insanity 250
Cases on criminal negligence follow these age groupings in
determing whether those accused of negligence have the capacity
to commit the crime alleged. A leading case is People v.
Squazza,2 51 holding that a boy of eleven cannot be convicted of
manslaughter in the second degree for having thrown a brick
from a roof, killing a person below, without affirmative proof
that he had capacity to understand the nature and quality of the
act and knew that it was wrong.
It is apparent that there is a great deal of difference in the
way the problem of infancy is handled in the civil and criminal
cases.
One is impressed by the harshness manifested in the age
groupings in the criminal law. It is altogether possible that
the age of complete irresponsibility should be raised appreciably
" Between the ages of seven and fourteen no presumption
of law arises at all, and that which is termed a malicious intent-
a guilty knowledge that he was doing wrong,-must be proved by
the evidence, and cannot be presumed from the mere commission
of the act." Reg. v. Smith, supra.
"May, op. cit. supra note 136, at Sec. 34.
'State v. Gom, 9 Humph. (Tenn.) 175 (1848), Com. v. Cava-
lier, 284 Pa. 311, 131 Atl. 229 (1925)
-1 "Our compassion and sympathy have been greatly excited in
favor of the accused. He is, although of sufficient age to be legally
responsible for violations of the law (infant of' fourteen accused of
murder, convicted of voluntary manslaughter, ed.) yet but a mere
child and the homicide committed by him was done in defense of
his father. These facts induced us to look closely into the
record, with the hope that we might find something that would
justify us in sending the case back, so that he might have another
chance before the country But with all our prepossessions and
anxiety in his favor we have been unable to do so." Irby v. State,
32 Ga. 496, 498 (1861) State v. Smith, 213 N. C. 299, 195 S. E.
819 (1938), 1 Wharton, op. cit. supra note 244, at 121.
May, op. cit. supra note 136, at 38.
81 N. Y. S. 254 (1903). Accord, State v. Milholland, 89 Iowa 5,
56 N. W 403 (1893), Watson v. Com., 247 Ky. 336, 57 S. IV (2d)
39 (1933). Note (1941) -29 Ky. L. J. 472.
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It was the opinion of Judge Stephen that it should be advanced
to twelve years.
2 52
The Juvenile Court has relieved the situation somewhat in
cases coming within its jurisdiction. But there is a hiatus of
several years between the upper age limits of Juvenile Court
jurisdiction and a youth's majority at twenty one. 25 3 Should a
seventeen or eighteen year old boy be in the same position as an
adult as regards his capacity to commit crime? Is it consistent
to hold such a lad to the standard of members of his class, de-
termined by age, intelligence and experience in torts, to give him
the right to affirm or disaffirm in contracts, but to place him in a
class with adults in the determination of capacity for criminal
liability?
It may be argued that society is impressed by the apparent
propensity of youth for crime and must protect itself. Without
discussing whether such propensity is a natural one, it may be
suggested that youth seems to have a like propensity for the
commission of torts. The problem is a difficult one with many
ramifications, but it is believed that the tort rule on the capacity
of infants is the more satisfactory 
2 54
2. Insane persons
The Restatement of Torts contains a caveat that the Insti-
tute expresses no opinion as to whether the standard of care m
the case of the insane is that of a reasonable man under like cir-
cumstances. 25 5
There is authority for the position that an insane person
was responsible for Ins torts in the same way as an ordinary
person in the early law.25 6 The principle was apparently based
2 Stephen, op. cit. supra note 123, at 98.
'Note, Hall and Glueck, Cases on Criminal Law (1941) 425.
See People v. Lewis, 260 N. Y. 171, 183 N. E. 353 (1932).
"It s the opinion of the writer that the criminal rule is too
harsh in applying an adult standard after the infant reaches the
age of fourteen. The infant may be able to distinguish good from
evil at an earlier age'than he is able to distinguish the wise from the
unwise, but, it remains, an infant of fourteen is immature as to
moral perception as well as to discretion. Especially in crimes in-
volving negligence, this rule works a hardship upon the infant for in
these instances he has no intention of accomplishing the wrongful
act but does so by his failure to exercise the proper discretion."
Note, supra note 251, at 476.
Restatement, Torts, op. cit. supra note 100, at sec. 283, caveat.
Wigmore, supra note 5, at 446. Cf. Hornblower, Insanity and
the Law of Negligence (1905) 5 Col. L. Rev. 278.
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upon the doctrine of liability without fault.25 7 The law looked
to the damage to the one injured and not to the fault of the de-
fendant. Where fault was not an element in the determination of
liability, one who was insane could be responsible as well as one
who was compos mentis.
However, the doctrine of strict liability has long ago given
way to a rule of liability based upon culpability of some sort.
This principle, enunciated in 1616 in Weaver v Ward,25 8 is now
firmly entrenched in the law of England.25 9 Massachusetts ac-
cepted the doctrine in 1850260 and other states have followed.
It would seem logical that in a legal system where liability
is based upon some sort of wrongful conduct 201 an insane person
would not be liable for his torts. Insanity should destroy his
capacity for fault.
But the prevailing rule is otherwise.2 62 The leading Amen-
lean case which involves the liability of an insane person for
damages caused by his negligence-is Wiliams v. Hays,2 63 where
Bohlen, Liability in Torts of Infants and Insane Persons
(1924) 9.
1 Hobart 134 (1616).
'Stanley v. Powell, 1 Q.B. 86 (1891)
'Brown v Kendall, 6 Cush (Mass.) 292 (1850).
There remain, of course, a number of recognized exceptions
to the general rule that there can be no liability without fault.
Harper, op. cit. supra note 33, at sees. 155-216.
"Dean Ames considered that an insane person should escape
liability The relation of the doctrine of liability without fault to
this problem is discussed by him at some length in an article in the
Harvard Law Review "So that today we may say that the old law
has been radically transformed. The early law asked simply, 'Did
the defendant do the physical act which damaged the plaintiff?'
The law of today, except in certain caseq based upon public policy,
asks the further question, 'Was the act blameworthy9 ' The ethical
standard of reasonable conduct has replaced the unmoral standard
of acting at one's peril. Nor is the modern ethical standard applied
even now to all cases logically within its scope. Under this doctrine
a lunatic unable to appreciate the nature or consequences of his act
ought not to be responsible for the damage he has inflicted upon
another. These decisions must be regarded as survivals of the
ancient rule that where a loss must be borne by one of two ino-
cent persons, it shall be borne by him who acted. Inasmuch as
nearly all the English writers upon torts, and many of the American
writers also, express the opinion that the lunatic not being culpa-
ble, should not be held responsible, it is not unreasonable to antici-
pate that the English courts and. the American courts, not already
committed to the contrary doctrine, will sooner or later apply to
the lunatic the ethical principle of no liability without fault." Ames,
Law and Morals (1908) 22 Harv. L. Rev. 97, 99-100.
:' 143 N. Y. 442, 446, 38 N. E. 449, 450 (1894). Annotation
(1913) 42 L.RA. (N. S.) 83.
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the rule is expressed as follows, "The general rule is that an in-
sane person is just as responsible, for hls torts as a sane
person, and the rule applies to all torts, except perhaps those in
which malice and, therefore, intention, actual or imputed, is a
necessary ingredient, like libel, slander and malicious prosecu-
tion." A number of states have made insane persons liable for
their torts by statute.
264
It would seem clear that where a definite mental state is
required, as for example, in fraud,2 65 malicious prosecution,2 66
and in defamation on a privileged occasion 26 7 the defendant's
insanity must of necessity be a complete bar to the action. It
has been doubted, however, whether slander and libel generally,
should be included in the exceptions to the rule26 s but the courts
have made no distinction between "legal malice" and genuine
malice.2
69
How are the courts able to rationalize the general rule mak-
ing an insane person liable for his torts ? They have given a
number of explanations. Numerous decisions repeat the maxim,
"Where one of two innocent persons must suffer a loss, it should
be borne by the one who occasioned it. "270 Professor Bohlen has
pointed out that this is merely a restatement of the old concept
of liability without fault, dressed up in a new form.27 1 Admit-
ting tins, the argument remains a persuasive one. There is no
reason of social interest why the estate of a lunatic should not
be taken as compensation for the harm he has done by conduct
falling below that which the group requires of its members, ex-
cept insofar as his private assets insure the public against his
I Cal. Civil' Code (Deering, 1937) sec. 41; Mont. Rev. Codes
(And. and McF., 1935) sec. 5686; N. D. Comp. Laws (1913) sec.
4346; Okla. Stat. (Harlow, 1931) sec. 9405; S. D. Comp. Laws
(1929) sec. 89.
Chaddock v. Chaddock, 130 Misc. 900, 226 N.Y.S. 152 (1927).
'Beufeuf v. Reed, 4 La. App. 344 (1926).
b" Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 Pac. 281 (1908), Fahr
v. Hayes, 50 N.J.L. 275, 13 Atl. 261 (1888).
'Note (1938) 22 Minn. L. Rev. 853, 859-860.
"Yeates v. Reed, 4 Blacf. (Ind.) 463 (1838), Irvine v. Gibson,
117 Ky. 306, 77 S. W 1106 (1904), Dickinson v. Barber, 9 Mass.
225 (1912). Cf. Ullrich v. New York Press Co., 23 Misc. 169, 50
N.Y.S. 788 (1898).
- Seals v. Snow, 123 Kan. 88, 90, 254 Pac. 348 (1927), Wil-
liams v. Hays, 143 N. Y. 442, 447, 38 N. E. 449 (1894); Karow v.
Continental Ins. Co., 57 Wis. 56, 64, 15 N. W 27 (1883).
' Bohlen, op. cit. supra note 257, at 17.
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care and support.2 72 Although it creates an exception to the
doctrine that there can be no liability without fault, the rule has
in it a great deal of practical expediency
Other cases suggest that public policy requires the en-
forcement of such liability in order that Nelatives of the insane
person shall be led to restrain him properly 2 73 A number of
decisions point out that if lunacy were a defense, tort feasors
would be tempted to simulate or pretend insanity, thus intro-
ducing into civil trials all the uncertainty and confusion, which
the plea of insanity has occasioned in the criminal law 274
It is undoubtedly true that the plea of insanity has
occasioned uncertainty and confusion in the criminal law.2 7 5
'Restatement, Torts (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1929) sec. 167, Special
Note.
"The problem of insane persons is somewhat different from that
of infants Children are the future adults of the world, and it
may be socially undesirable to handicap them at the very beginning
of their careers by the burden of judgments which they must dis-
charge before they can attain economic independence." Ibid.
I McIntyre v. Sholty, 121 Il. 660, 664, 13 N. E. 239 (1887), Seals
v. Snow, 123 Kan. 88, 90, 254 Pac. 348 (1927)
"If an insane person is not held liable for his torts, those in-
terested in his estate, as relatives or otherwise, might not have a
sufficient motive to so take care of him as to deprive him of oppor-
tunities for inflicting injuries upon others. There is more in-
justice in denying to the injured party the recovery of damages for
the wrong suffered by him, than there is in calling upon the relatives
or friends of the lunatic to pay the expenses of his confinement, if
he has estate ample enough for that purpose. The liability of
lunatics for their torts tends to secure a more efficient custody and
guardianship of their persons." McIntyre v. Sholty, supra.
-"'Williams v. Hays, 143 N. Y. 442, 447, 38 N. E. 449 (1894).
1 Cooley on Torts (3rd ed. 1906) 173.
"The gradations of mental disease are exceedingly difficult
to distinguish the one from the other. The problem of insanity as
a defense to crimial responsibility has not been satisfactorily
solved. There is much to be said against introducing into the law
of Torts questions upon which the scientific world is so divided in
opinion and which, must be established by expert testimony, itself
a notoriously uncertain and unreliable means of proof." Restate-
ment, Torts (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1929) 30.
"Another important consideration is derived from the fact that
the distinction between insanity and the cunning of malice is not
always sufficiently clear for ready detection, and a rule of irre-
sponsibility in respect to such persons would be likely to result in
similar difficulties in civil cases to those which have brought the
administration of crimial law into disrepute wherever the plea
of insanity is interposed. It is generally believed, and with
abundant reason, that sometimes in the administration of the crim-
inal law, persons who are abnormal only in ungovernable passion
and depravity escape the proper consequences of their criminal
conduct on a plea of mental disease; and on the other hand a care-
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The rule itself -is clear enough. Insanity is a defense to a
criminal action, 276 including one based upon negligence. The
difficulty lies in defining insanity Various tests27 7 have ibeen
proposed by the courts for determining whether a person accused
of crime is legally insane but none of them are satisfactory to
either the legal or medical profession. The problem is compli-
cated by the fact that experts appear for both the state and the
accused in most jurisdictions and feel obligated to champion the
side which calls them.
The fact that the law takes such divergent positions on the
question of insanity, allowing it to be used as a defense to a
criinal prosecution but refusing, subject to exceptions, to
permit the defendant to avail himself of it as a means of escape
from liability in tort, causes one to inquire whether both rules
are correct. The fact that the Restatement of Torts issues a
caveat on the question is an indication of the difficulty of the
problem.
It is submitted that the whole matter, civil and criminal, is
a question of policy and social expediency Either rule is possi-
ble in either field under recognized principles. 2 78 The law, civil
and criminal, is adverse to liability without fault. But there are
a few examples of it in each field.
ful observation of the workings of criminal tribunals will leave upon
the mind no doubt that the jury that should dispassionately try the
question of crmunal responsibility, is sometimes urged on and im-
pelled by public passion and clamor to find in the freaks of delusion
the evidences of crimial intent and depravity, and to convict and
punish those who are only deserving of compassion." 1 Cooley,
op. cit. supra note 274, at 173-174.
11 Wharton, Criminal Law, op. cit. supra note 244, at sec. 405
and cases cited.
' For a brief critique of the legal tests of insanity from legal
and psychiatric points of view, see Glueck, Insanity-Criminal Law,
8 Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (1937) 64-68.
New Hampshire refuses to accept any "test" of insanity hold-
ing that none is satisfactory. In that state the question of insanity
is altogether one of fact for the jury. State v. Jones, 50 N. H.
369 (1871).
'During the growth and flower of the "guilty mind" doctrine
in the crinmal law, it was practically impossible to justify a con-
viction where the defendant was insane. Liability was based upon
a wrongful act powered by a guilty mind. But, today, with the
emphasis upon the social harm of the act rather than upon the
mental state of the defendant, it should be possible to justify the
conviction of an insane defendant in crimes not requiring specific
intent, if the crimnal law desires to go that far. It is altogether
a matter of policy. See the excellent discussion, Radin, Criminal
Intent, 8 Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (1937) 126.
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All things considered, it is believed that the existing rule is
the proper one in each instance. The object of an action in tort
is compensation to the pgrty injured. In a criminal prosecution,
however, the law is interested, primarily, in deterrence. 27 9 This
wholesome purpose would not be furthered by the "punishment"
of an insane individual since neither he nor other insane persons
i the community would be deterred thereby to any great extent
from the commission of similar offenses. While it is socially
desirable to remove such potentially dangerous individuals from
the community, it would be better to do so in a civil rather than
in a criminal proceeding.
3. Physwcians and surgeons.
Physicians and surgeons arc not judged by the standard of
the ordinary prudent man. Their speciaf training and experience
qualify them as persons who, in their fidlds, possess a type of
judgment and knowledge so superior to that reasonably to be
expected of average men that the law is justified in creating a
separate standard to be used in judging their professional acts.
2s 0
The standard used in the tort cases for judging the conduct
of a physician or surgeon is the skill and care that an ordinary
physician or surgeon practicing in the same or a similar locality
and under the same or similar circumstances would use.
28 1
It may be argued that this is only another way of saying
that a physician or surgeon is held to the usual standard of "the
Glueck, Principles of a Rational Penal Code (1921) 41 Harv.
L. Rev. 453; Harno, Rationale of a Criminal Code (1937) 85 U. Pa.
L. Rev 549.
Experts, other than physicians and surgeons, having a capacity
so much greater than the usual norm as to justify their classifica-
tion as "extreme abnormals" should also be included in this category,
The list would then include, for example, such persons as trained
engineers. It is doubtful, however, if the cases support such addi-
tions at this time. A tendency toward the larger category appears
in recent discussions by writers on the subject. Green, supra note
97, at 1039; Harper, op. cit. supra note 33, at sec. 71; Restatement,
Torts, op. cit. supra note 100, sec. 299, comment d.
'Kalloch v. Hoagland, 239 Fed. 252 (1917), Dunman v. Raney,
118 Ark. 337, 176 S. W 339 (1915) Whitesell v. Hill, 101 Iowa
630, 70 N. W 750 (1897) Small v. Howard, 128 Mass. 131 (1880),
Hales v. .Rames, 146 Mo. App. 232, 130 S. W 425 (1910), Booth v.
Andrus, -91 Neb. 810, 137 S. W 884 (1912) McCandless v. McWha ,
22 Pa. St. 261 (1853) Note (1933) 11 Tex. L. Rev. 261. The
locality is not where the services are rendered but where the phy-
sician practices. Hoover v. McCormick, 197 Ky. 5D9, 247 S. W -718
(1923) Note (1941) 29 Ky. L. J. 223, 224.
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reasonable man under the circumstances" and the fact that-the
defendant is a physician or surgeon -s one of the "eircuma-
stances." This is not quite true as a matter-of fact. Of course,
the same result could be reached under either rule. But the
creation of a separate rule for physicians makes-the ordinary
physician in the community, not the reasonable man m the com-
munity, the norm. This centers the attention of the judge or
jury upon the ordinary physician-rather than upon the ordinary
prudent man in the community as the standard and it results in
holding physicians to a higher degree of care-than the applica-
tion of the other standard.2 82 Courts realize. this and it has
resulted in the enunciation of the separate standard in numerous
cases.
A number of cases state that the standard is the ordinary
physician or surgeon sn good standing28 3 practicing in the/same
or a similar locality and under the same or similar circumstances,
The phrase, "in good standing," should be included, it is
suggested, to exclude quacks and pretenders from consideration.
If such incompetent individuals were considered ps a part of the
group, the norm would be below the standard reasonably to be
expected of physicians practicing in the community
The suggestion is well taken, if the omission of the phrase
results in the inclusion of such persons in the determination of
the standard. In former times, it might have had this effect.
It is believed, however, that the present miunmum requirements
hich the various states have prescribed for practice largely
obviate this danger.284 Although the fact that the physician was
I "In the case of physicians and surgeons, the courts have gone
one step further'than in ordinary negligence cases and have made
the standard not that of a reasonably prudent man under the cir-
cumstances, but that of an average physician in good standing in
the same or sinilar locality The reasonably prudent man
standard does not adequately emphasize the professional capacity of
the physician." Note (1941) 29 Ky. L. J. 476, 479.
" See Dunman v. Raney, supra note 281, at 342.
'There are distinct and differing schools of .practice. Con-
sequently, most states provide for more than one type of examina-
tion. For example, the chiropractor and the ordinary practitioner
of "medicine" take different state examinations.
The treatment given by a physician is to be tested by the
principles and practices of hisparticular school. Patten v. Wiggin,
51 Me. 594 (1862), Floyd v. Michie, - Tex. Civ. App. -, 11 S. W
(2d) 657 (1928). However, the school 'must be one which is
recognzed. See Hansen v. Pock, 57 Mont. 51, 187 Pac. 282 (1920).
(Chinese herb doctor), Nelson v. Harrngton, 72 Wis. -591, 40 N. W-
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practicing without a license is generally held to be irrelevant
in ani action based on negligence, civil or criminal, unless the
violation of the statute was the proximate cause of the injury,
the uniform enforcement of license requirements has removed
most mountebanks from the profession. While a few individuals
who obtained their licenses a number of years ago may not be as
competent as some of the younger men, so long as they are
legally entitled to practice, it would appear that they are a
recognized part of their profession and should be considered in
determining its standards.
The criminal cases are not clear as to the standard used in
determining whether a physician is negligent in the care and
skill with which he treats a patient. Cases have held that he is
liable when he exhibits gross lack of competency or gross inatten-
tion or criminal indifference to the patient's safety 285 This is
another way of saying that he is liable for gross negligence. 2 86
However, the courts do not state the standard by which this
gross negligence is measured. Is it measured by the conduct of
the "reasonable man," the usual standard for the measurement
of negligent conduct in both civil and criminal cases 2 Or do the
courts use the conduct of "an ordinary physician practicing in
the same or a similar locality," the standard by which the acts
of physicians are measured in ctvil cases as the measure2
This question cannot be answered by reading the cases. It is
submitted, however, that the standard of care by which the
negligence of physicians is measured is identical in civil and
criminal cases. When the courts refer to the gross negligence
requisite for conviction in a crimnal prosecution, they refer to
negligence as measured by the standard of "an ordinary
physician or surgeon practicing in the same or a similar locality
and under the same or similar circumstances." This conclusion
is based upon the fundamental proposition that civil and
228 (1888) (Clairvoyant physician). Cf. Spead v. Tomlinson, 73
N. H. 46, 59 Atl. 376 (1902) (Christian Scientist).
See Note (1929) 29 Col. L. Rev. 985, 987; Note (1929) 78 U.
of Pa. L. Rev. 91, 98.
'Feige v. State, 128 Ark. 465, 194 S. W 865 (1917), Hampton
v. State, 50 Fla. 55, 39 So. 421 (1905); State v. Lester, 127 Minn.
282, 149 N. W 297 (1914).
= "The jury have found that it was applied as the result of
foolhardy presumption or gross negligence, and that is enough."
Holmes, J., in Com. v Pierce, 138 Mass. 165, 180. State v. Hardister,
38 Ark. 605 (1882).
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crinmnal negligence are the same in nnd differing only in
degree.28 7 Ordinarily, the standard for measuring each is the
"reasonable man." There are good reasons for the creation of a
separate standard for determining the negligence of a physician
in a civil case. If all negligence is the same in kind, then the
same reasons should exist for the creation of this new standard
to measure the negligence of a physician in a .crimmal case,
This is especially true when, as here, there have been advanced
no reasons why this new standard does not apply just as well to
criminal as to civil cases.
This standard is, of course, an objective one. A subjective
standard was employed in the criminal cases in judging the
conduct of physicians until the latter part of the nineteenth
century 28 8 A number of early American cases hold that if a
person assumes to act as a physician and prescribes treatment
with an honest intention of curing the patient, he is not guilty of
manslaughter if the patient dies, no matter how ignorant he is of
medical science.28
9
Such a rule led to very unsatisfactory results. The early
case of C(ommonwealth v. Thompson 290 will illustrate. From the
evidence it appears that the defendant was a grossly ignorant
quack. He had three remedies which he called coffee, well-my-
gristle, and rarneats. Powerful emetics were administered to
the deceased until he died, to all appearances from the effects of
the treatment. The appellate court held that if a person assum-
ing to act as a physician prescribes treatment for-a patient with
an honest intention of curing him but through ignorance of the
quality of the medicine or the nature of the disease, or both, the
treatment proves fatal, the person prescribing is not guilty of
murder or manslaughter.
The decision is vigorously criticized by Holmes, J., in the
subsequent, leading case of Commonwealth v. Piere.2 9 ' There
was evidence that the defendant, who practiced as a physician,
'French v. State, 235 Ala. App. 570, 180 So. 592 (1938), Cam
v. State, 55 Ga. App. 376, 190 S. E. 371 (1937), Potter v. State, 174
Tenn. 118, 124 S. W (2d) 232 (1939); Bell v. Com., 170 Va. 597,
195 S. E. 675 (1938).
Note, supra note 282, at 477.
1Honnard v. People, 77 IMI. 481 (1875), State v. Schultz, 55 Iowa
628, 8 N. W 469 (1881), Rice v. State, 8 Mo. 561 (1844).
16 Mass. 134 (1809).
21138 Mass. 165 (1882).
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on being called to attend a sick woman, prescribed that-she be
kept in flannels saturated with kerosene, and that this course of
treatment caused her death. The court instructed that if the
death were caused by "gross and reckless negligence" he would
,be guilty of culpable homicide. It further instructed that the
defendant was to be tried by no other or higher standard of skill
or learning than that which he necessarily assumed in treating
her. The jury found that the treatment was applied as the result
of gross negligence and held the physician guilty of man-
slaughter.
In affiming the judgment the appellate court repudiated
Commonwealth v. Thompson. Judge Holmes pointed out that
liability for reckless, grossly negligent conduct is an old and
firmly recognized principle in the law of homicide. He con-
sidered that a physician may be guilty of such conduct regardless
of his good intentions. The standard to be applied is an objective
one,2 9 2 and the physician will not be permitted to hide behind
the veil of his own ignorance. This is the modern view,
supported by numerous cases.
2 93
The limitation in the Pierce Case that the defendant is to
be tried by no other or higher standard of skill or learning, than
that which he necessarily assumed in treating the patient raises
several questions. Suppose A has a pain in his stomach and
asks B, a friend but a man of no special training, what to do
about it. B suggests that he take a dose of 'castor oil. In fact A
has an attack of appendicitis and this may be very bad advice.
It does not follow, however, if A dies, that B is guilty of criminal
negligence in prescribing the wrong remedy B did not hold out
that he was a physician and he did not in fact possess special
knowledge. He is to be judged by the standard of the reasonable
man under the circumstances. 29 4 However, if a physician had
Id. at 177-178; Annotation (1920) 9 A. L. R. 211, 213. Contra,
Keedy, supra note 143, at 85, n. 2.
m State v. Gile, 8 Wash. 12, 35 Pac. 417 (1894), Hampton v.
State; 50 Fla. 55, 39 So. 421 (1905), Com. v Pierce, 138 Mass. 165
(1884), State v. Wagner, 78 Mo. 644 (1883), Wharton, op. cit. supra
note 64, at 713.
' "In dealing with a man who had no special training, the
question whether his act would be reckless in a man of ordinary
prudence is evidently equivalent to an inquiry into the degree of
danger which common experience shows to attend the act tinder
the circumstances known to the actor." Commonwealth v. Pierce,
supra note 293, at 178.
THE ImPORTANCE o THE "-CIRCUMsTANCES OF THE CASE" 171
volunteered advice gratuitously under similar circumstances, he
would be required to exercise the skill of the o.rdifiiarily.compe-
tent physician practicing in that or a similar locality.2 95
A more difficult problem is raised by the question, do
country and city doctors ordinarily assume different standards
of skill and learning in the treatment of patients 9 Let us
suppose that A is a mountain doctor practising his profession
in a remote section of the state of Kentucky Thirty-five years
,ago he satisfied the minimum requirements of the state board of
examiners, they were not very high. He has found a plale for
himself in the community, prescribes simple remedies. He drives
an ancient car but often is forced to ride mule-back to reach a
patient in an inaccessible section. Charges for his services are
small. Many never pay him, others pay ih coal and potatoes.
On the other hand, B is a city doctor practising in Lexing-
ton, Kentucky, a cultured and wealthy community He gradu-
ated from a large university, at the head of his class. Since that
time he has had several graduate courses, has studied abroad, and
makes every effort to keep up with advancing knowledge in his
profession. He drives a large car, takes no cases outside of the
city limits,, and his fees are large.
The same-formula 29 6 will be used in determining whether
the conduct of either of these men is criminally negligent in the
treatment of a patient. The test will be, did he use the care and
skill that an ordinary physician practising in the same or a
sinilar locality and under the same or similar circumstances
would have used? But there may be enough difference in the
two locdlities and in the other ircumstances in'the cases to cause
a difference in the verdicts as to guilt or innocence, although the
two physicians gave their patients treatments which were
identical.
-M "If a practising surgeon were to offer his services gra-
tuitously in a similar situation, he would be required to exercise
the skill of the ordinarily competent surgeon." Restatement, Torts,
op. cit. supra note 100, at sec. 299, comment e.
I "If the defendant ... were a poor ignorant 'Brazos bottom'
negro farmer on the one hand, or a prosperous agricultural chemist
on the other, such would be a most vital factor in the case, although
the 3udge would give the same formula in each instance." Green,
supra note 97, at 1037, fn. 23. See Regina v. Nicholas, 13 Cox, C. C.
75 (1875) (failure of poor, ignorant grandmother to supply ilegiti.
mate child of her daughter with proper nourishment).
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This results in the city doctor having to exercise a higher
degree of skill and care in much of his practice than the country
doctor. The emphasis upon locality in the formula is largely
responsible for this. That was intended. The courts by
emphasizing the locality factor in physician cases have gone a
long way toward creating separate levels of skill and care for
country and city doctors.
But that is as it should be. A cannot be expected to know
as much as B about appendicitis, cancer, heart disease, and
many other human ailments, he does not hold hinself out to
know as much. His rewards are not as great in his remote
section of the state. Nevertheless, the people of his section must
have some medical attention. Gradually, legislatures raise the
standards for admission to the practice of the profession, but,
wisely, these are not advanced too rapidly If they are, remote
regions are left without any service. All of these problems must
be kept in mind by legislatures, by judges, and by juries.
4. Uniesual physcal and mental characteristics in ndivid-
uals who are not "extreme abnormals."
Considerable allowance is made for the mental deficiencies
of infants and of insane persons 29 7 by the separate standards
which the law has evolved for the measurement of the conduct
of individuals who fall into these categories. Similarly, the
separate standard devised for judging the professional acts of
physicians and surgeons takes into account their superior training
and skill.29 8 The question arises, whether the law makes any
allowance for unusual physical or mental characteristics in those
individuals who are not members of any of the above classes of
"extreme abnormals"2
Since a separate standard has not been created for such
persons, they are all judged in civil actions by the objective
standard of "the reasonable man under the same or similar
circumstance. ' '2 99 A certain amount of subjectivity is intro-
duced, however, by considering physical defects as a part of the
"circumstances."
I See the discussion, supra, pp. 156-166.
- See the discussion, supra, pp. 166-172.
"Unless the actor is a child or an insane person, the standard
of conduct to which he must conform to avoid being negligent is that
of a reasonable man under like circumstances." Restatement, -Torts,
op. cit. supra note 100, at sec. 283.
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Thus, the man who is blind is required to do what a reason-
able man would do "under the circumstances." He must take
cognizance of the risks which his infirmity entails and govern
himself accordingly Since a reasonable man would do so, one
who is blind is required to use his remaining faculties with
greater diligence in order to compensate as far as possible for
his inability to see. 300 A similar rule applies to those having
other forms of physical disability, where the defect is sub-
stantial and capable of being proved with reasonable certainty 3
0 1
Nearsightedness, deafness, the disablement resulting from the
loss of an arm or leg, and the physical infirmities incident to old
age come within the category 302
However, there are limits to the ability of such persons to
compensate for their defects. They are constantly a hazard to
themselves and to others, although their other faculties are alert.
Nevertheless, it is not feasible to eliminate such individuals from
daily contact with life entirely This consideration finds expres-
sion-in the civil cases in such statements as, "the streets are for
the use of the general public for the weak, the lame, the
halt, and the blind, as well as for those possessing perfect
health.''303 Consequently, it is not negligence, as a matter of
law, for such persons to walk on a public street unattended.30 4
Thus, where a blind man fell into an open ditch in a street, it
was not error to refuse an instruction that it was negligence for
hun to use, the streets without an attendant, or unless he
constantly felt his way with his staff.30 5
'Armstrong v. Day, 103 Cal. App. 465, 284 Pac. 1083 (1930),
Furtado v. Bird, 26 Cal. App. 152, 146 Pac. 58 (1914), Balcom v;
City of Independence, 178 Ia. 685, 160 N. W 305 (1916), O'Dell's
Admr. v. Louisville & N. Ry. Co., 200 Ky. 745, 255 S. W 550 (1923),
"Restatement, Torts, op. cit. supra note 100, at sec. 289, com-
ment h.
'Furtado v. Bird, 26 Cal. App. 152, 146 Pac. 58 (1914) (deaf),
Kerr v. Connecticut Co., 107 Conn. 304, 140 At. 751 (1928) (deaf)
O'Dell's Admr. v. Louisville & N. Ry. Co., 200 Ky. 745, 255 S. W
550 (1923) (deaf and dumb), Keith v. Worcester Street R. Co.,
196 Mass. 478, 82 N. E. 680 (1907) (near-sighted), Fenneman v.
Holden, 75 Md. 1, 22 At. 1049 (1891) (deaf). See Seavey, Negli-
gence--Sub3ective or Ob3ective, supra'note 150, at 14, fn. 14.
'Hill v. Glenwood, 124 Ia..479, 100 N.W -522, 523 (1904)
'Neff v. Town of Wellesley, 148 Mass. 487, 20 N.E. 111 (1889)
Smith v. Wildes, 143 Mass. 556, 10 N.E. 446 (1887),
'Foy v. City of Winston, 126 N.C. 381, 35 S.E. 609 (1900)
"A, a blind mami, is walking down a sidewalk in which there is
a depression coated with ice. A normal man would see the depres-
sion and avoid it. A, being blind, is not negligent in walking into
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It is apparent that the use of the streets and other public
places by those with physical defects puts-a burden of additional
care upon the general public. Those who contemplate action
must keep in mind that abnormal individuals may be affected. 308
This is limited, however, by the fact that the care required is
never greater than a reasonable man would use under the
circumstances. Since the conduct of those physically defective
is judged by the same standard, the determination of the amount
of care which should be exercised, in a particular case, which
involyes both normal and physically defective persons, depends
upon a balancing of the interests of the parties concerned and a
conclusion based upon community standards of what is
reasonable.
It may be concluded that while a physical defect is not an
excuse for carelessness, a certain amount of allowance is made
for those who are so afflicted. The question such a person should
ask himself before acting is, What would a reasonable man, if he
were similarly afflicted, do under the circumstances? A reason-
able man who was blind might use the sidewalk but he would not
cross a crowded street unattended nor attempt to drive an auto-
mobile.3
0 7
The effect of physical defects is not as clear in criminal as
civil cases. The decisions on the question are rare and only two
it." Restatement, Torts, op. cit. supra note 100, at sec. 289, com-
ment h, illustration 5.
"A, a blind man walking upon the highway, approaches a level
railway crossing. He stops and listens but, hearing no whistle blown,
crosses the track and is struck by a tram which is approaching with-
out giving the required warnings by whistle and bell. A is not
negligent in so going although a normal man is required not only
to listen but to look up and down the track." Id. at sec. 289, com-
ment h, illustration 6.
"Balcom v. City of Independence, 178 Ia. 685, 160 N.W 305
(1916).
'There are numerous instances where it is inpossible for an
,individual having substantial physical defects to make up for his
infirmities by the increased use of his other faculties. For example,
assume, that X, blind, deaf, and seventy years of age, has lived in a
small town all of his life. He knows the town like a book and can
find his way to any street. The one bright spot in his day occurs at
4 P.M. when he totters to the depot to get the evening paper which
is thrown from the fast express wnch goes through without stop-
ping. He does this and looks forward to it eagerly because he likes
to feel that he is helping. One day he loses his sense of direction,
walks in front of the tram and is killed. He is guilty of contributory
negligence.
THE IMPORTANCE o THE "' CIRCUMSTANCES op THE CAsE" 175
have been found. In Rex v Grout,30 s a pedestrian was walking
on a public highway at dusk when the defendant, who was proved
to be near-sighted, ran over him with a cart, causing his death.
The judge, in summing up, told the jury (inter alia) that the
question forstheir consideration would be "whether the prisoner,
having the care of the cart, and being a near-sighted man, eon-
ducted himself in such a way as not to put in jeopardy the limbs
and lives of his Majesty's subjects. If they thought he acted
carelessly and negligently, they would pronounce hun guilty of
manslaughter." He was convicted.
In Tift v State,80 9 a later case decided in this country, it
was held that it was for the jury to determine whether the act
of driving an automobile by one who knew he was subject to sud-
den attacks of vertigo, which rendered hn wholly unable to steer
such a machine or to control its movements, constituted criminal
negligence, where a collision occurred because of such an attack.
In each of these cases the court considers the physical defect
of the defendant as a circumstance to be taken into considera-
tion in determining whether he is criminally negligent, but
neither decision states the effect of such defect upon the degree
of care which the accused is required to, exercise. Could the
defendant in a criminal case plead that due to defective hearing
or poor eyesight he should be permitted to exercise less care than
the normal individualQ Lacking decisions in the criminal law
upon the question, it is necessary to draw an analogy from the
civil cases.
Such an analogy would appear to be sound. Negligence,
civil and criminal, are the same in kind.3io Both are grounded
fundamentally on the proposition that lack of reasonable care
under the circumstances is negligence. However, a higher de-
gree of carelessness is necessary to secure a conviction in a
criminal case than is required in a civil action.311 In the case
of murder, in additi6n to a still higher degree of carelessness,
there is the added requirement that there must be actual
knowledge of the danger on the part of the defendant.3i 2
6 Car. & P 629, 172 Eng. Rep. 1394 (1834).
17 Ga. App. 663, 88 SXE. 41 (1916).
' See note 287, supra.
Discussed, supra, at pp. 127-139.
Discussed, supra, at pp. 139-155.
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It would appear, then, that physical defects are a part of
the circumstances to be considered in the determination of crnn-
inal negligence, as in civil, and that the standard of care is the
same in each instance, except that m order to inpose criminal
liability the conduct of the accused must show such a lgh de-
gree of carelessness as to constitute the "reckless or wanton
disregard" required in criminal cases.
*While some allowance is made for physical defects in both
civil and criminal cases in that they are considered by the judge
and jury as part of the "circumstances," a different rule ob-
tains generally in the case of mental defects. Although the law
takes into account superwr mental characteristics m judging
the professional acts of physicians and surgeons, no allowance
is made for those adult individuals who possess less than normal
intelligence, unless they are "insane." 31 3
Worthington v Meneer 314 is the leading civil case. The
plaintiff, a person of low mentality, was injured while employed
as a track hand in the mine of the defendants. A judgment in
his favor was reversed by the appellate court. On the question
of contributory negligence as affected by his mental condition,
the court stated the following rules as a guide in the new trial,
which was ordered :315
"If he was merely a person of dull mind, who could labor for
his own livelihood, and there was no apparent necessity of putting
Of course, even the insane person is responsible for his torts
under the majority rule. See the discussion, supra, pp. 161-166.
1" 96 Ala. 310, 11 So. 72 (1837). Accord, Georgia Cotton Oil Co.
v. Jackson, 112 Ga. 620, 37 S.E. 873 (1901), Johnson v. Texas &
P Ry Co., 16 La. App. 464, 135 So. 114 denying rehearing to 16 La.
App. 464, 133 So. 517 (1931) The rule is the same as to other
mental defects: Bessemer v. Campbell, 121 Ala. 50, 25 So. 793 (1898)
and Taylor v. Richmond & D. R. Co., 109 N.C. 233, 13 S.E. 736 (1891)
(excitability), Vaughan v. Menlove, 3 Bing. New Cas. 468 (1837)
(bad judgment). It has been stated that there is a conflict of
-authority as to whether forgetfulness of a known fact is negligence.
Reynolds v Los Angeles Gas & Electric Co., 162 Cal. 327, 122 Pac.
962 (1912) Perhaps the cases can be reconciled by the statement
that forgetfulness is excusable only when the actor's attention is
diverted by such cause or causes as would ordinarily induce such
forgetfulness in an ordinarily prudent or careful person in the same
or in a similar situation. Buckley v. Westchester Lighting Co., 93
App. Div 436, 87 N.Y.S. 763 (1904), aff'd. 183 N.Y.S. 506, 76 N.E.
1090 (1905), City of Charlottesville v. Jones, 123 Va. 682, 97 S.E.
316 (1918) Annotation, 39 L.R.A. (N.S) 896. See Pound, op. cit.
supra note 147, at 178-179. Restatement, Torts, op. cit. supra note
100, at secs. 289(h), 289(o), 290(d).3sId. at 315, 73.
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hin under the protection of a guardian to keep him out of harm's
way, he is chargeable with the same degree of care for his personal.
safety as one of brighter intellect, as any attempt to frame and
adapt varying rules of responsibility to varying degrees of mtelli-
gence would necessarily involve confusion and uncertainty in the
law."
Professor Edgerton has stated the rule in the following
positive language .316
"The individual's actual mental characteristics and qualities,
capacities and habits, reactions and processes, are not, then, among
the 'circumstances' which the law considers in determining whether
his conduct was, under the circumstances, reasonably safe. He must
behave as well (as safely) as if he were in all mental respects nor-
mal, although he may be in some respect subnormal; he need behave
no better, though he may be in some respect super-normal. In fact,
the broad proposition that no merely mental fact about the (sane)
individual is material, would seem to require only one substantial
qualification; his special- knowledge 2s highly material."
Dean Green agrees with this positive enunciation of the rule
for the purpose of statement but considers that as a matter of
fact the jury does take into consideration the mental character-
istics of the defendant along with his numerous other
qualities.3 17 "The difference lies between law in statement and
law in operation. between jural postulates and jury judg-
ments. "318
Of course, Dean Green is right to a certain extent. It is
impossible to keep th.e jury from consideringI such personal
characteristics of the defendant as are manifested by his conduct
during the trial, especially, while he is on the stand, and as may
be deduced from a recital of the evidence pertinent to the case.
But Dean Green is over-emphasizing the opportunity which
the jury has to consider the mental characteristics of the defend-
ant because, if Professor Edgerton has stated the rule correctly,
these are not part of the cireumstances of the case and, con-
sequently, will not be presented to the jury; except in the in-
direct ways mentioned in the last paragraph. The defendant
would desire a more adequate presentation, if it were possible.
A hypothetical case will show more clearly the difficulties
encountered by the defendant in getting before the jury his
mental defects and their relation to the injury of which, he
complains. Suppose that Flutterbuss is one of those individuals
m Edgerton, supra note 134, at 857.
'Green, supra note 97, at 1042.
Id. at 1043.
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who is easily "rattled." While driving his car to the office,
he collides with A's automobile badly damaging the machine and
seriously injuring the driver. Assume, further, that the acci-
dent is caused largely by the fact that Flutterbuss became
excited, something that a normal man would not have done under
the circumstances, and stepped on the accelerator instead of the
foot-brake.
Although Flutterbuss' excitability contributed materially to
the accident, it is not one of the "circumstances of t e case."
Consequently, he will not have the opportunity to present evidence
of his excitability to the jury as a defense or to show its bearing
upon the other factors in the case. The practical effect of the
law, as it now is, is to limit the "circumstances of the case" to
those circumstances relating to the environment and to the de-
fendant's physical defects. Mental defects, less than insanity,
are not to be taken into consideration.
It is true that the jury may learn somethnig of his excitable
nature from his demeanor in the courtroom and upon the stand
but the effect of this is qualified by the judge's instruction that
he is to be judged by the conduct of the reasonable man.319 It
therefore becomes apparent that a defendant having mental
defects is at a greater disadvantage before the jury than one
having physical defects since the latter are a part of the "cir-
cumstances" and may be openly presented to the jury under
existing rules of law and some allowance made for them.
Several reasons may be suggested for the fact that the law
does not, as yet, make any allowance for mental defects not
amounting to legal insanity in civil actions involving negligence.
One is that this part of negligence, like some others, is so un-
"'The excitability of the defendant is not one of the "circum-
stances" in a suit involving negligence. Such an individual is held
to the standard of conduct of a "reasonable" man. Bessemer Land
Co. v. Campbell, 121 Ala. 50, 25 So. 793 (1898), Taylor v. Richmond
& D. R. Co., 109 N.C. 233, 13 S.E. 736 (1891).
"We do not understand that an employer's liability for the
negligent act of his superintendent can be measured -by the latter's
poise of temperament, nor that the character of a given act of the
superintendent in respect to negligence can be made to depend upon
his excitability or the reverse. It is the duty of a supermtndent to
do what an ordinarily careful and prudent man would do under the
same circumstances, and the employer is liable if he fail to do this,
and injury results to an employe." Bessemer Land Co. v. Campbell,
supra, at 799.
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crystallized that it cannot be subjected to'statement.3 20 A more
fundamental explanation is that mental conditions in this
mstance, as in others, are so difficult of proof that the law
hesitates to take them into consideration unless they are so clear
as to be readily apparent, because of the danger of fraud.
3 2 1
In the criminal law, the rule is well settled that a mental
defect is not a defense to a criminal action unless it is sufficient
to constitute what amounts to legal insanity32 2 in the particular
"It may well be that the 'law of negligence' is so uncrys-
tallized (except for an inconsequential part) that it cannot be sub-
jected to statement other than in terms of an analysis through winch
the cases must be run as they arise." Green, op. cit. supra note 97,
at 1047, n. 37.
'However, the law does consider mental conditions where in-
sanity is not involved in some other cases in spite of this objection.
Recovery in tort for mental injuries in the absence of physical im-
pact is now allowed in most instances. The progress of the law may
be traced through the following series of articles: Bohlen, Right to
Recover for Injury from Negligence Without Impact (1902) 41 Am.
L. Reg. (N.S.) 141, Throckmorton, Damages for Fright (1921) 34
Harv. L. Rev. 260; Goodrich, Emotional Disturbance as Legal
Damage (1922) 20 Mich. L. Rev. 497; Bohlen and Polikoff, Liability
in Pennsylvania for Physical Effects of Fright (1932) 80 Umv. Pa.
L. Rev. 627; Green, 'Frzght" Cases (1933) 27 Ill. L. Rev. 761, 873;
Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts
(1936) 49 Harr. L. Rev. 1033; Harper and McNeely, A Re-examina-
tion of the Basis for Liability for Emotional Distress (1938) Wis.
L. Rev 426; Vold, Tort Recovery for Intentional Infliction of Emo-
tional Distress (1939) 18 Neb. L. B. 222; Seitz, Insults-Practical
Jokes-Threats of Future Harm--How New as Torts? (1940) 28 Ky.
L. J. 411.
The present slight tendency in the law to consider mental con-
ditions is reflected in the problem under discussion by a few cases
whch, either by decision or dictum, are contra to the general rule
that no allowance is made for mental defects not amonting to legal
insanity in civil actions involving negligence. -See the cases and
materials cited by Edgerton, supra note 134, at 855-856, fn. 29, (2)
and (3). Seattle Elec. Co. v. Hovden, 190 Fed. 7 (1911), cited by
Professor Edgerton has been called a sport. Seavey, supra note 150,
at 12, fn. 12. See Johnson v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 67 Minn. 260,
69 N.W 900 (1897) (Suggesting that the law apply the same stand-
ard to old people whose mental faculties are npaired by age that
is employed in the case of infants.)
I Bell v. State, 120 Ark. 530, 180 S.W 186 (1915), Chriswell v.
State, 209 Ark. 255, 283 S.W 981 (1926), Sage v. State, 91 Ind. 141
(1883), Moulding v. Com., 172 Ky. 370, 189 S.W 251 (1916), Com. v.
Cooper, 219 Mass. 1, 106 N.E. 545 (1914); Com. v. Wireback, 190 Pa.
138, 42 Atl. 542 (1899) Com. v. -Hollinger, 190 Pa. 155, 42 Atl. 548
(1899), Witty v. State, 75 Tex. Cr. R. 440, 171 S.W 229 (1914).
"The law does not undertake to measure the intellectual capaci-
ties of men. Imbecility of mind may be of such a degree as to con-
stitute insanity in the eye of the law, but mere mental weakness, the
subject being of sound mind, is not insanity, and does not constitute
a defense to crime. The law recognizes no standard of exemption
from crime less than some degree of insanity or mental unsound-
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jurisdiction. '32 3  Consequently, a showing of ignorance, 324 stu-
pidity,3 25 or similar form of mental deficiency 32 6 does not estab-
lish an incapacity to commit crime. Neither is it sufficient to
show that the accused is more passionate than ordinary men,327
that he has a terrible temper and excitable disposition, 328 or
that he is suffering from shell shock.
32 9
The rule that a mental defect is no defense to a criminal
action applies to negligent as well as to intentional crimes. 330
An individual who is mentally defective, but legally sane, is
capable of the kind of blameworthy conduct requisite for crim-
inal negligence, since he has sufficient capacity to have knowl-
edge of the circumstances of the case.
It might, however, be questioned whether one who is men-
tally dull or ignorant would be intelligent enough to have knowl-
edge of the danger (although aware of the circumstances) in a
number of situations where a normal person would recognize the
peril. This raises the question whether such. an individual
should be convicted of murder under such circumstances.
ness. Immunity from crime cannot be predicated upon a merely
weak or low order of intellect coupled with a sound mind." War-
tena v. State, 105 Ind. 445, 5 N.E. 20, 23 (1886). Davidson, Mental
Deficiency and Crhmsnal Responsibility (1935) 1 N.J.L. Rev. 123.
"I There is a brief critique of the legal tests of insanity from
legal and psychiatric points of view by Glueck. 8 Encyclopedia of
the Social Sciences, op. cit. supra note 277. Most courts adhere to
the so-called "right and wrong test." People v. Sherwood, 271 N.Y.
427, 3 N.E. (2d) 581 (1936), Lowe v. State, 44 Tex. Cr. .R. 224, 70
S.W 206 (1902) May, op. cit. supra note 136, at sec. 41, Crotty, The
History of Insanity as a Defense to Crzme in English Criminal Law
(1924) 12 Calif. L. Rev. 105. A substantial number of jurisdictions,
however, subscribe to the test of "irresistible impulse." If the ac-
cused was irresistibly impelled to commit the criminal act, he is not
responsible. See State v. Felter, 25 Ia. 67 (1868). New Hampshire
refuses to accept any "test" holding that none is satisfactory. In
that state the question of insanity is altogether one of fact for the
jury. State v. Jones, 50 N.H. 369 (1871) For a thorough discussion
of the tests of legal insanity, see Glueck, Mental Disorder and the
Criminal Law (1925) Chaps. 6, 7, and 8.
'Com. v. Pierce, 138 Mass. 165 (1884)
1 U. S. v Cornell, Fed. Cas. No. 14, 868 (1820)
"People v Hurley, 8 Cal. 390 (1857), People v Marquis, 344
Ill. 261, 176 N.E. 314 (1931), State v Palmer, 161 Mo. 152, 61 S.W
651 (1900) Com. v. Szachewicz, 303 Pa. 410, 154 Atl. 483 (1931)"
Powell v. State, 37 Tex. 348 (1872)
m'Fitzgerald v. Com., 81 Ky 357 (1883)
"'Willis v. People, 32 N.Y. 715 (1865).
'People v. Gilberg, 197 Cal. 306, 240 Pac. 1000 (1925).
=Com. v. Pierce, 138 Mass. 165 (1884)
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Although the law, as yet, has given no relief to such persons
in the case of the negligent murder, a slight tendency in that
direction is indicated, perhaps, by the rule now recognized in
some jurisdictions that feeble-mmdedness may be considered m
determining whether a homicide has been committed with a de-
liberate and premeditated degign to kill, and thus may be effee-
tive to reduce the grade of the offense.
3 31
Indeed, considerable criticism of the prevailing rule, in
its entirety, is developMg.33 2 It is urged that the doctrine that
a mentally defective person must either be held criminally to a
full degree of responsibility for his acts or else entirely ac-
quitted should be modified. A middle course of responsibility is
suggested to be attained by applying the presumptions now re-
served only for children to such mental children, where the
mental defect is one of sub-normality The "mental age" of a-
subnormal adult accused of crime would be determined by the
use of intelligence tests and such other means as modern psy-
chologists might be able to devise, plus available corroborative
evidence, and if this was found to be less than fourteen years,
the usual presumption applicable to children of like age would
be applied.
'People v. Moran, 249 N.Y. 179, 163 N.E. 553 (1928). Weihofen,
Partial Insanity and Crminal Intent (1930) 24 Ill. L. Rev. 505;
Note (1930) 79 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 209.
'=Glueck, op. cit. supra note 323, at 197; Woodbridge, Physical
and Mental Infancy in the Criminal Law (1939) 87 U. of Pa. L. Rev.
426; Woodbridge, Some Unusual Aspects of Mental Irresponsibility zn
the Crmnal Law (1939) 29 Jr. Crim. L. 822, 832.
Cf. Perkins:
"The effort of the Classical School to establish in advance an
exact measure of punishment for each transgression, by the creation
of new offenses, and the division of others into degrees, etc., has been
found to be inadequate. The modern trend is toward individualiza-
tion of treatment as evidenced by such techniques as indeterminate
sentence, probation and parole. Unsoundness of mind of every kind
and degree would seem to require consideration in a fully developed
scheme of individualized socio-penal treatment; but it would seem
wiser to leave most of this field to the part of the machinery which
functions after conviction, than to inject an increasing amount of it
into the jury trial itself. Probably the social interests in the general
security and the social interests in the individual life would both be
promoted by keeping within rather narrow limits the kind and
degree of mental disorder wuch entitles the defendant to a verdict
of not guilty, while at the same time readjusting the machinery after
the point of conviction in such a manner as to keep abreast of every
contribution of science in the field of disorders of the mind." Per-
kins, Partial Insanity (1934) 25 Jr. Crim. L. 175, 185.
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While courts in the past have looked with disfavor upon
applying this presumption of law designed for children to adults
having a mental age of fourteen years or less,3 33 the suggestion
is the most persuasive yet offered as a solution to the problem of
mental deficiency,3 34 and a new generation of jurists may give
it credence.
B. OBJECTIVE CIRCUMSTANCES (CHARACTERISTICS
OF T-HE ENVIRONMENT)
The tort as well as the criminal cases have been considered
in the discussion, of the effect of the subjective circumstances
(characteristics of the actor) upon the determination of negli-
gence.3 3 5 This was done because the criminal law upon this
phase of negligence has not developed as much as the civil, or it
has developed along different lines, and it was thought helpful
to examine the tort cases for the purpose of comparison and
analogy This procedure will not be followed, however, in the
discussion of the relation of the objective circumstances (char-
acteristics of the environment) to the question of negligence be-
cause there are numerous criminal cases on the subject and no
important "differences in the development of the law in the two
fields.
1. Dangeroussnstrumentalites.
'The nature of the instrumentality being used by the defend-
"There is a vast difference between (the intellect of) a child
at the age of eleven years and that of a man of twenty-eight, and
while perhaps there is a presumption that an infant of tender years
is incapable of committing a crime, that presumption does not extend
to one of advanced years, requiring the state to rebut 'it. When a
man reaches manhood the presumption is that he possesses the or-
dinary mental capacity normally pertaining to his age. The
presumption of the lack of power of thought and capacity in favor of
a child is due more to the number of years he has lived than to the
character of the development of his mind, and it is a merciful rule
established by the courts due to his tender years, but that reason
does not apply when he comes to manhood. Deficiency of intellect
is a species of insanity, and when that is set up as a defense for
crime the burden is on the accused to prove it, the presumption being
that he is sane." State v. Schilling, 95 N.J.L. 145, 112 Ati. 400, 402
(1920).
"'While it is recognized that- psychologists and psycluatrists
are not in accord as to the accuracy of the results when mental tests
are administered to adults and the results given in mental ages, the
courts should none the less make greater use of them, coupled with
other information that case-workers and physicians could supply, in
determining the criminal capacity of defendants." Woodbridge,
supra note 332, at 454.
See supra, pp. 155-182.
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ant when the injury occurred is one of the most important ob-
jective circumstances to be taken into consideration in the de-
termination of criminal negligence.
This is because the kind of instrumentality used by the
actor generally has a great deal to do with the degree of danger
which his conduct creates. X handles a cane negligently in a
crowded room. There is little danger to human life and safety
But if he had handled a loaded pistol negligently in the same
room the risk of harm would have been increased many times.
Since the care required in a particular case is proportional to
the danger,33 6 the actor must exercise a high degree of care,
if he is using a dangerous agency
In the past firearms were regarded as the most dangerous
agency because of their extensive use and their great potential
harm. In the interest of the preservation of human life and
safety, a high degree of care is demanded of those who use
-t4em.33 7 Poison, too, is a highly dangerous agency capable of
serious harm to human life. Consequently, anyone who handles
poison in such a way that, as a proximate result of his action, it
produces death or bodily injury is criminally responsible if hs
conduct is reckless under the circumstances. Thus, it has been
held to be manslaughter where a nurse negligently administered
laudanum to a child with the intention of quieting it,3 s and for
a druggist to label negligently a package "paregoric" for
"laudanum," thereby causing the death of a child.33 9
Although there are some early decisions which seem to hold
that life may be taken in certain instances by spring guns set to,
11 Wharton, op. cit. supra note 244, at 664. "The law regards
the circumstances surrounding each case, and the nature of the
animal or machinery under control. Greater care is required to be
taken of a stallion than of a mare; so in the management of asteam
engine, greater care is necessary than in the use of a plow. The
degree of care is always in proportion to the danger to be appre-
hended. Meredith v. Reed, 26 Ind. 334 (1866).
State v. Hardie, 47 Ia. 647 (1878), State v. Vance, 17 Ia. 138
(1864), Sparks v. Com., 3 Bush 111 (Ky. 1867), State v. Emery, 78
Mo. 77 (1883), People v. Fuller, 2 Park. Crin. Rep. 16 (1855), Reg.
v. Salmon, L. R. 6 Q.B.D. 79 (1880), R. v. Rampton, Kelyng ,41
(1664).
"The law exacts of all persons the duty of being exceedingly
cautious and careful in the use of or in the handling of firearms or
other dangerous agencies." Potter v. State, 162 Ind. 213, 70 N.E. 129
(1904).
3"Ann v. State, 11 Humph. 159 (Tenn. 1850).
.Tessymond's Case, 1 Lewin, C.C. 169 (1838).
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defend property, 340 modern authority is strongly opposed to
this view.3 4 1 Such devices are extremely dangerous, and when
a law breaker is killed or badly maimed by one of them the in-
jury is out of all proportion to the crime.34 2
In Commonwealth v. Beckham,34 3 the defendant, owner of
a small chili stand, placed a gun inside the building in such a
position that it would fire when a window was raised from out-
side. The deceased, a "drifter," apparently tried to get into
the building and was shot. It appeared from the evidence that
.the defendant had merely intended to frighten intruders away
and not to kill them. Nevertheless, the jury found hun guilty
of criminal negligence in placing "so dangerous an agency" in
so perilous a position.
In addition to the fact that set guns are highly dangerous
agencies capable of inflicting serious injuries or death upon
those whom they are set to catch, it must be kept in mind that
tley constitute a menace to everyone who may, by chance, come
in contact with them. Children, visitors, even officers of the
law upon their official business are all possible victims.
'In Pierce v. Commonwealth3 44 the accused, keeper of a
small store, had been troubled by burglars for several years. He
set a spring gun, aimed so as to fire into the body of any person
who opened the door from outside. One night he failed to lock
the door. A policeman upon his official duties tried the door,
found it unlocked, pushed it open, and was killed. The appel-
late court held that a conviction of murder in the second degree
would have been affirmed if there had not been error upon
another point.
I U. S. v. Gilliam, 1 Hayw. & H. 109, Fed. Cas. No. 15, 205a
(1882) (in a dwelling house or the curtilage surrounding it); State
v. Moore, 31 Conn. 479 (1863) (dictum), Gray v. Combs, 7 J. J.
Marsh. 478 (Ky. 1832).
'State v. Green, 118 S.C. 279, 110 SXE. 145 (1921), State v.
Barr, 11 Wash. 481, 39 Pac. 1080 (1895), annotations, 19 A.L.R. 1437;
28 A.L.R. 873; 37 A.L.R. 1101.
'Life is more valuable than property. Simpson v. State, 59
Ala. 1 (1877). Owners of property are not disposed to be lenient
with trespassers and thieves but they must find other means to deal
with them. The law has provided its own punishments for such of-
fenders. These are not only orderly, they are less severe than the
taking of life or serious mutilation, which is always a possibility
when such devices are used.
306 Mo. 566, 267 S.W 817 (1924).
135 Va. 635, 115 SE. 686 (1923).
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The right to use a set gun even in the protection of life is
limited. One may justify a killing by such a device when he,
himself, would have been justified in taking life. Thus, a de-
fendant could justifiably take life by a set gun in order to pre-
vent an atrocious and violent felony 3 4 5 This is really not a
limitation, one could use a pistol, recognized as a dangerous
agency, under like circumstances.
An automobile is not a dangerous instrumentality per se,
3 46
but it may become a dangerous instrumentality, if used negli-
gently, because of its size, weight, and the tremendous speed
which it is capable of attainng
3 47
The Georgia jurist who said, "It is not the ferocity of auto-
mobiles that is to be feared, but the ferocity of those who drive
them,'' 3 4s uttered a half-truth. It is the combination of the
driver and the automobile that is to be feared. Reckless persons
operate instrumentalities other than automobiles. But the com-
bination of such an individual and a motor car is more dangerous
than it would be if he were operating a different agency An
automobile alone and of itself will not move, explode, or do in-
jury to anyone, but the turning of a key or a button and the
pressure of a pedal release energy which is capable of great
harm.3 49 In dealing with such an instrumentality "reasonable
care" is a high degree of care.3 50
2. Other Objective Circumstances.
The condition of the weather at the time and place of the
act is an important element in the determination of negligence.
3OState v.,Marfaudille, 48 Wash. 117, 92 Pac. 939 (1907), State
v. Barr, 11 Wash. 481, 39 Pac. 1080 (1895)
"' Annotation, 16 A.L.R. 270 et seq. Cf. Herr v. Butler, 101 Fla.
1125, 132 So. 815 (1931), Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80
Fla. 441, 86 So. 629 (1920)
a3Story v. United States, 16 F.(2d) 342 (1926), Held v. Com.,
183 Ky. 209, 208 S.W 772 (1919), People v. Rosenheimer, 209 N.Y.
155, 102 N.E. 530 (1913). Berry, on Automobiles (7th ed. 1933)
6.227.
'Lewis v. Amorus, 3 Ga. App. 50, 59 SME. 338, 340 (1907).
'4 In 1939 1,210,200 persons were injured in automobile acci-
dents; 32,100 were killed. The World Almanac (1941) 588.
0The category of dangerous instrumentalities includes a num-
ber of other agencies. For example, see Mattson v. Minnesota &
N.W R. Co., 95 Minn. 477, 104 N.W 443 (1905) (dynamite), Wood
v. McCabe & Co., 151 N.C. 457, 66 S.E. 433 (1909) (dynamite), Mor-
.- ison v. Appalachian Power Co., 75 W Va. 608, 84 S.E. 506 (1915)
I (electricity).
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'Since an actor is required to take cognizance of the ordinary
operation of the forces of nature, 3 51 he must have due regard for
such factors-as rain,.snow, sleet, smoke and darkness. 35 2 Thus,
one who is driving ani automobile along a highway on a rainy
night must exercise a higher degree of care and operate his car
at a lower speed than if he were driving on a clear night and
under a full moon.
Those who act in populous communities must. exercise a
higher degree of care than would otherwise be necessary in
order to prevent their conduct from becoming reckless under
the circumstances. An act may be practically harmless when
committed in the country and yet exceedingly dangerous to
human life and safety if performed in the heart of a town or
city 35 3 As pointed out in Hull's Case, 3 54 a timber tossed from
'Restatement, Torts, op. cit. supra note 100, at sec. 290, com-
ment d.
"A person is charged with ordinary knowledge of the workings
of (the forces of nature), and his conduct, if it is to escape being
stigmatized as wanting in care, must conform to the normal work-
ings of these forces. For example when he.leaves his auto-
mobile on a grade, with the brakes not effectively set and without
turning the front wheels to the curb, he is chargeable with knowl-
edge of the fact that gravity is likely to cause the vehicle to move
down grade and injure persons in its path." Pope v Reading Co.,
304 Pa. 326, 156 Atl. 106, 109 (1931).
'Gilbreath v. Blue & Gray Transp. Co., 269 Ky 787, 108 S.W
(2d) 1002 (1937) (highway covered with ice), Barber v. El Dorado
Lumber Co., 139 So. 29 (La. 1932) (foggy and rainy weather),
Dominick v. Haynes Bros., 127 So. 31 (La. 1930) (smoke screen),
Castile v. Richard, 157 La. 274, 102 So. 398 (1924) (cloud of dust),
Peoples Drug Stores v Wiudham, 12 Atl. (2d) 532 (Md. 1940)
(smoke screen), Johnson v. Reinhard Bros. Co., 285 N.W 536 (Minn.
1939) (cloud of snow) Salera v Schroeder, 183 Minn. 478, 237 N.W
180 (1931) (dense fog), Ebling v Nielson, 109 Wash. 355, 186 Pac.
887 (1920) (darkness and heavy ram), Palmer v. Marceille, 106 Vt.
500, 175 Atl. 31 (1934) (smoke), Franklin v. Bristol & Carriage Co.,
Ltd., (1941) 1 All E.R. 188 (blackout in wartime).
I In People v Clements, 130 N.Y.S. 612, affirmed, 207 N.Y. 682,
101 N.E. 1114 (1911), the defendant was a licensed blaster and-for
a period of about two months had been engaged m blasting on
premises at the corner of two streets in the city of New York. On
the day m question an unusually violent explosion occurred, the're-
suits of which were so extensive as to scatter rocks over a wide
territory. The deceased, a boy, was standing on the stairway of an
elevated station from 125 to 140 feet distant. A piece of rock pro-
jected by the explosion struck him with such violence as to crush
his skull. Two .other persons were also ihjured by flying rock. De-
fendant claimed that he had been working in soft rock and placed
the same amount of powder he had been using in" this particular
charge, but, unknown to him, he had reached hard rock, which oc-
casioned the-difference in the results of the blast.. Experts agreed,
however, that the defendant was using twice as much powder- in
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the top of a building in the country is not fraught with much
danger,-to cry out is enough warning to anyone who might be
near. The same {iinber"tbssed from 'a buildui'in the .citj;, how-
ever,. is charged with potential harm to hundreds. The owner
m~y break a c6lt'to the saddle with little thouglt 'of- danger
in the country, but he will be guiltv of manslauglter, if': deathi
oicurs while he is-attempting to bend-the unruly animal to- his
will upon" a crowded thoroughfare.3 55
Numerous other objective circumstances could, be given but
it is impossible to discuss in detail the infinite variety of ob-
jective factors found in negligence cases.
In closing the discussion, it is well to emphasize that each
.of these varied factors'is but one. of the cirqiumstances in a par-
ticular case. Each factor must be taken .into consideration for
.they are interrelated. One cannot seize upon a single circum-
stance, whether it be subjective or objective,. and base his de-
cision upon that alone.3 56 A bull is generally classed as a
danerous agency Nevertheless, the mere fact that an owner
has placed a bull in an enclosure does not necessarily mean
that fie is guilty of criminal negligence, if someone- is gored.
""Guilt or innocence, and the degree of guilt, would depend
upon a variety of circumstaices ;-as the degree of vicious-
ness of the bull, the time, Whether day or night, when he ight
be put in- the field, the size of the field, its nearness to or "re-
moteness from a populous neighborhood, and many others
viich might be suggested, but whih cannot be foreseeii" dr
properly estimated except in their relation to other concomi-
tant circumstances." 57"
the holes as was safe, considering the location of the operationw. He
.was convicted of manslaughter.
='J. Kelyng, 40 (1664).
* 1 East, op..-cit. supra note 29, at 231.
6"'The amount of traffic on the highway or street, the adjacent
terrain, the grade of the highway, the condition. of the surface of the
highway oi. shoulders, the presence of'rain, snow, glare of the sun,
darkness, fog, and smoke must all-be considered in determining the
care required to relieve the driver for civil negligence. Each of
these external factors, or any combination of them, affects the -care
"whicl he: must exerctse. These factors likewise affect the care
which the driver must exercise to relieve himself of liability- for
'criminal negligence." Note (1942) -30 Ky. L. J. 430, 432.
" May, Crimial Law (3rd. ed. 1905) 225.
SECTION 8. THE CRIMINALLY NEGLIGENT BATTERY
Liability in the case of assault and battery, as in other
negligent crimes, is predicated upon the fact that the defend-
ant has created an unreasonable risk. The standard of care by
which the conduct of the accused is measured and the magni-
tude of risk required for liability are the same in this instance
as in manslaughter.
The crime presents a special problem, however, in that the
offense is commonly said to require an "intent to injure." 35s If
such a requirement were taken literally, the negligent battery
would be an impo sibility, since negligence always differs from
intent. 359 The courts, however, while rendering lip service to
the supposed requirement of intent, have evaded the rule by the
use of, various devices.
A number of cases "infer" an intent to injure from the
doing of a reckless act resulting in bodily contact. In State v.
Hamburg360 the defendant was indicted for assault and bat-
tery with an automobile. The state claimed that she drove her
car at a reckless rate of speed at night, when it was rammg,
and struck a pedestrian when the car skidded on a slippery
street. The court charged the jury, in substance, as follows-
"A wrongful intent is essential in a criminal prosecution for
assault and battery, though it may be inferred from the facts
and need not be specifically proved. Such intent may be in-
ferred where physical violence results from gross negligence,
'It is commonly stated by writers upon the English law that
the common law criminal battery requires an "actual intention" to
injure. Hall, supra note 223, at 138 and authorities cited.
In the United States it is commonly said that an "intent to in-
jure" is required at common law. Radley v. State, 197 Ind. 200, 150
N.E. 97 (1926), Luther v. State, 177 Ind. 619, 98 N.E. 640 (1912);
Com. v. Adams, 114 Mass. 323 (1873). May, op. cit. supra note 136,
at 260; Tulin, supra note 146, at 1052.
1 See the outline, supra page 151, showing a "working distinc-
tion" between negligence and intent.
4 W W Har. 62 (34 Del.), 143 At. 47 (1928). Accord,
Vasques v. State, 259 Pac. 1005 (Cal. 1927), State v. Sloanaker, 1
Houst. 62 (Del. 1858); Bleiweiss v. State, 188 Ind. 184, 122 N.E. 577
(1919); Luther v. State, 177 Ind. 619, 98 N.E. 640 (1912), Coin. v.
Randall, 4 Gray 36 (Mass. 1855); State v. Schutte, 87 NJ.L. 15, 93
Atl. 112 (1915); Tyner v. United States, 2 Okla, Cr. 689, 103 Pac. 1057
(1909). Note (1915) 63 U. Pa. L. Rev. 803.
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recklessness, or a wanton disregard of the consequences, al-
though there is no intent to use violence against anyone. This is
because every one is presumed to intend the probable conse-
quences of his own acts." The conviction was affirmed.
Apparently, it is the court's position that there is suf-
ficient "intent" for assault and battery, if the result is a
"probable consequence" of the negligent act. This is a new
definition of intent as the word is used in the law of crimes.
Intent is commonly taken to mean either (1) a purpose, design,
or hope that certain consequences will occur from the act, or (2)
a knowledge that they are substantially certain to be produced
by it.361 The factual situation in the Hamburg Case does not
satisfy even the second requisite, since, in that case the con-
sequences were only probable, not substantially certain. To
accept such reasoning would be to adopt a definition of "in-
tent" which. would be peculiar to assault and battery cases.
A number of other questionable subterfuges have been used
to evade the supposed requirement. Some courts permit reck-
lessness to "substitute' '362 for intent, others "imply''363 it
from extremely negligent conduct.
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Such expedients serve no useful purpose. They are fic-
"See the discussion, supra, p. 151. See Notes (1924) 22
Mich. L. Rev. 594; (1919) 17 Mich. L. Rev. 705; (1915) 13 Mich. L.
Rev. 594.
""But criminal negligence may sometimes be a sufficient sub-
stitute for deliberate intention in the commission of crime." Tift v.
State, 17 Ga. App. 663, 88 S.E. 41 (1916) (assault and battery).
Gross negligence is the equivalent of intent. People v. Hopper,
69 Colo. 24, 169 Pac. 152, 153 (1917).
' "To make one crimmally responsible for such injury there
must be such wanton and reckless disregard of the probable
harmful consequences to others as to imply the infliction of a will-
ful, intentional injury." Radley v. State, 197 Ind. 200, 150 N.E. 97,
98 (1926). Accord, Luther v. State, 177 Ind. 619, 98 N.E. 640, 642
(1912).
"It seems obvious that, under the beneficient fiction of implied
intent, we are developing a doctrine of negligent assault and bat-
tery." Note (1919) 17 Mich. L. Rev. 705.
"T he fact that the battery results from an unlawful act is
also of importance. If the unlawful act is malum %n se, or a proxi-
mate cause of the battery, or accompanied by negligence, it has been
held in a few states to be a sufficient basis for liability, and in Ohio
any unlawful act resulting in injury is enough. In any event, the
commission of an unlawful-act is usually regarded as some evidence
of negligence, to be considered with all the other circumstances by
the jury in determining whether or not the requisite degree of reck-
le3sness is found." Hall, supra note 223, at 148-149.
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tions, and tend to cloud the issue causing confusion and un-
certainty in the law This is another instance of "constructive
intent," which is equivalent to saying that liability is based upon
conduct rather than upon the mental state of the actor.36 5
Realizing this, contributors to legal periodicals3 6 6 and modern
texts,36 7 have repudiated the use of such fictions by the courts
and adopting a realistic view of the matter, have accepted the
criminally negligent battery as anestablished part of the law
If one seeks an explanation of the source and development of
the offense, he will do well to keep in mind the essential relation-
ship between manslaughter and battery Negligence as a basis
of criminal 'liability appears first in the seventeenth century'
in the case of homicide. 368 It appears that the negligent battery
was a later development drawn from an analogy to the negligent
manslaughter.3 6 9
This relationship between the two crimes is suggested in
the leading case of' Commonwealth v Hawkins,3 7 0 in which the
defendant-was accused of assault and battery with a dangerous
weapon. At the trial in. the Superior Court, the judge in-
structed that it was not necessary for the :government to prove
that the defendant intended to shoot anyone, that he would be
guilty if he fired the pistol "in a grossly careless and negligent
manner, or in a wanton and reckless manner,, and. by so doing
wounded Mary A. Powers."
The appellate court found no error in the instruction. The
rule is well established said the court, that one who negligently
.See the discussion, supra, pp. 34-41.'m "We have found most of the automobile assault and battery
cases following the historical development of battery in this count~y
which started in 1858 with the Sloanaker case, by which, as m mali-
slaughter, there may be liability for injury recklessly caused. ThIs|
development of battery was virtually completed before the first auto-
mobile case was decided m 1912." Hall, supra note 223, at 157. See
Tulin, cited supra note 146; Note (1942) 30 Ky L. J. 418.
"Clark, Criminal, Law (3rd. ed. 1915) 267; Clark & Marshall on
Crimes (4th. ed. 1940) sec. 198; Miller, op. cit. supra note. 108, at'
sec. 101(a). And see, May op. cit. supra note 136, at sec. 159.
"s See the discussion, supra, pp. 3-5.
SSee Professor Hall's discussion, Hall, supra, note 223, at
135-139.
7 157 Mass. 551, 32 N.E. 862 (1893) Accord, Brimhass v State,
31.Ariz. 522, 255 Pac. 165 (1927) (aggravated assault and battery),
State v Agnew 202'N.C. 755, 164'S.E. 578 (1932) Winkler v State,
45 Okla. Cr. 322, 283 Pac. 591 (1929) Tyner v United States, 2 Okla.
Cr. 689, 103 Pac. 1057 (1909)
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dvs *hn ak tAlt results in the death of another is guilty of man-
slaiighti', althoulgh lie did not contemplate such a result. "If"
Mary"Pibw haU died the defendant "would have been
guilty of manslaughter. As she sur'vived- the injury, the same
principle now requires a conviction of assault-and battery " Ap-
parently, the court is drawing an analogy from the negligent
manslaughter and basing a conviction of assault and battery
upon criminal negligence.
3 71
Numerous cases use the manslaughter analogy or cite man-
slaughter cases in support of a conviction of negligent battery
An analogy from the negligent manslaughter is proper in
convictions of battery in cases where there was a direct, bodily
contact. But the analogy would not be proper, it is submitted,
where the killing resulted from a failure to act. The courts,
however, apparently, have failed to recognize this distinction
3 72
or have understood that in most negligent batteries the defend-
ant does affirmatively cause bodily contact, and, so, have em-
ployed the analogy 373
'A number of courts hold that where the facts would sustain
a conviction of negligent manslaughter the accused is guilty of
assault and battery if no death ensues on the theory that the offenses
are so related that a battery is included in the greater offense. Thus,
in State v. Sudderth, 184 N.C. 753, 114 S.E. 828 (1922), the court
approves the following language from another case:
"Where the facts of a case of homicide constitute the crime of
manslaughter, the same state of facts will make an assault if no
killing ensues."
Tins is a non sequitur. The two crimes are separate offenses;
neither is necessary to or contained in the other. State v Thomas,
65 N.J.L. 598, 48 Atl. 1007 (1901). Note (1942) 31 Ky L. J. 418, 419.
Such decisions fail to distinguish between an analogy to the negligent
manslaughter and a conclusion that an assault and battery is neces-
sarily included in that offense.
. The distinction occurs because there can be no battery unless
there is a direct or indirect physical contact caused by the defendant.
However, in the case of the negligent manslaughter there may be
liability predicated upon a failure to act.
Thus, in State v. O'Brien, 32 N.J.L. 169 (1867), the defendant
was convicted of manslaughter for failing to perform ins duty as a
switch tender in consequence whereof a tram ran off the track and a
passenger was killed. Certainly, if death had not ensued from his
negligence but only personal injury a charge of criminal assault and
battery could not have been sustained.
' It would appear that a more logical analogy would have been
to murder, where negligence is sufficient to satisfy the requirement
of "malice." In such cases it has long been recognized that when the
courts speak of "implied malice" they disguise the fact that no
malice is actually required. Similarly, it can be shown in the battery
cases that, although the courts say an "intent to injure" is required,
they distort the law, since negligence is sufficient to satisfy the re-
quirement.
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The use of this analogy has probably contributed a great
deal to the fact that negligence in manslaughter and negligence
in battery have-developed along parallel lines and that they are
identical in kind and in degree.
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